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STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION
This Court has jurisdiction pursuant to Utah Code Annotated § 78A-3-102. This
appeal concerns a Public Service Commission Report and Order issued on November 3,
2008. Heber Light & Power Company's Application for Agency Review was filed on
December 3, 2008, and deemed denied on December 23, 2008. Heber Light & Power
filed its Petition for Review with the Utah Supreme Court on January 21, 2009.
STATEMENT OF ISSUES FOR REVIEW AND STANDARD OF REVIEW
1.

Public Service Commission Jurisdiction.
The Utah Public Service Commission ("Commission") determined that, as a matter

of law, the Commission has subject matter jurisdiction over Heber Light & Power
Company ("HLP"), a political subdivision, to the extent that HLP was acting like a
"public utility." Commission Order p. 20. (R.34). The Court should reverse the
Commission ruling because the Legislature has not granted the Commission jurisdiction
over governmental entities, such as Heber Light & Power, and has expressly excluded
governmental entities from the definition of "corporations," and "persons" subject to
Commission jurisdiction. Public Service Commission's rulings on its jurisdiction or
authority are subject to a correction-of-error standard. Associated General Contractors v.
Board of Oil Gas and Mining, 38 P.3d 291, 297 118 (Utah 2001). HLP presented this
issue to the Commission through HLP Motion to Dismiss for Lack of Subject Matter
Jurisdiction. (R.20).
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2.

Final Agency Action/Extraordinary Writ
Rocky Mountain Power ("RMP") has filed a Motion to Dismiss for Lack of

Jurisdiction. Rocky Mountain Power claims that the Commission's Order is not final
agency action subject to review. The parties have briefed this issue, but the Court has
deferred ruling on this issue until presentation of the merits. The issue raised by Rocky
Mountain Power's motion is not subject to a standard of review.
Heber Light & Power Company has filed a Motion for an Extraordinary Writ.
This motion seeks relief in the event the Court determines that it lacks jurisdiction
because the Commission's Order is not final agency action. The issue raised by HLP's
petition is not subject to a standard of review.
CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, STATUTES.
ORDINANCES. RULES AND REGULATIONS
Utah Code Ann. § 54-2-1. Definitions.
As used in this title:

(5)

(a) "Corporation" includes an association, and a joint stock company having
any powers or privileges not possessed by individuals or partnerships,
(b) "Corporation" does not include towns, cities, counties, conservancy
districts, improvement districts, or other governmental units created or
organized under any general or special law of this state.
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(7)

"Electrical corporation" includes every corporation, cooperative

association, and person, their lessees, trustees, and receivers, owning, controlling,
operating, or managing any electric plant, or in any way furnishing electric power
for public service or to its consumers or members for domestic, commercial, or
industrial use, within this state, except independent energy producers, and except
where electricity is generated on or distributed by the producer solely for the
producer's own use, or the use of the producer's tenants, or for the use of members
of an association of unit owners formed under Title 57, Chapter 8, Condominium
Ownership Act, and not for sale to the public generally.

(16)

(a) "Public utility" includes every railroad corporation, gas corporation,

electrical corporation, distribution electrical cooperative, wholesale electrical
cooperative, telephone corporation, telegraph corporation, waiter corporation,
sewerage corporation, heat corporation, and independent energy producer not
described in Subsection (16)(d)? where the service is performed for, or the
commodity delivered to, the public generally, or in the case of a gas corporation or
electrical corporation where the gas or electricity is sold or furnished to any
member or consumers within the state for domestic, commercial, or industrial use.
Utah Code Ann. § 54-2-2. Definition of "person"
As used in this chapter, "person" includes all individuals, corporations,
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partnerships, associations, trusts, and companies and their lessees, trustees, and
receivers.
Utah Code Ann. § 54-4-1. General jurisdiction
The commission is hereby vested with power and jurisdiction to supervise and
regulate every public utility in this state, and to supervise all of the business of
every such public utility in this state, and to do all things, whether herein
specifically designated or in addition thereto, which are necessary or convenient in
the exercise of such power and jurisdiction; provided, however, that the
Department of Transportation shall have jurisdiction over those safety functions
transferred to it by the Department of Transportation Act.
Utah Code Ann. § 54-7-10. Orders on hearings-Time effective
(1)

Orders of the commission shall take effect and become operative on the

date issued, except as otherwise provided in the order.
(2)

They shall continue in force for the period designated in the order, or until

changed or abrogated by the commission.
STATEMENT OF CASE
I.

The Utah Public Utility Code Does Not Give the Public Service Commission
Jurisdiction Over Governmental Entities, Such As Heber Light & Power
Company.
Rocky Mountain Power initiated this proceeding before the Utah Public Service

Commission claiming that Heber Light & Power Company was unlawfully providing

4

service outside the municipal boundaries of its members and requesting that the
Commission order HLP to discontinue such service. Amended Complaint at ^ 14, 27.
(R.9). HLP moved to dismiss RMP's Complaint because HLP is not a public utility
subject to Commission jurisdiction. (R.20).
The Commission denied HLP's motion and refused to recognize that, as a matter
of law, governmental entities are not "public utilities" subject to Commission jurisdiction.
Report and Order ("Commission Order") at p. 20. (R.34). Rather, it held that HLP is a
"public utility" to the extent that it is "acting just like a public utility." Id. at p. 20. (R.34).
The Commission did not expressly cite the statute giving it jurisdiction over a
governmental entity, but presumably based its assertion of subject matter jurisdiction on
Utah Code Ann. § 54-4-1. This statute generally vests the Commission "with power and
jurisdiction to supervise and regulate every public utility in this state." Utah Code Ann. §
54-4-1.
The issue here is whether the Commission has subject matter jurisdiction over a
governmental entity such as Heber Light & Power Company. The utility code does not
grant the Commission jurisdiction over governmental entities, such as HLP, and excludes
governmental entities from the definition of "electrical corporation" subject to
Commission jurisdiction. The Commission therefore lacks subject matter jurisdiction.
II.

The Court Has Jurisdiction to Review the Commission's Order.
Rocky Mountain Power has filed a Motion to Dismiss for Lack of Jurisdiction.

Rocky Mountain Power claims that the Commission's Order is not final agency action
5

under Union Pacific R.R. v. Utah State Tax Comm % 2000 UT 40 \\l, 999 P.2d 17.
Heber Light & Power Company responded that the Commission's Order satisfies Union
Pacific, because, inter alia, the Commission's Order asserting jurisdiction over
governmental entities as public utilities has far-reaching legal implications beyond these
proceedings. The Court deferred ruling on Rock Mountain Power's motion until the
presentation of the merits.
Heber Light & Power Company has filed a Petition for Extraordinary Writ. In the
Petition, Heber Light & Power Company requests that the Court retain jurisdiction over
the issues raised in this appeal under Rule 65B of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure and
Rule 19 of the Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure. Heber Light & Power Company's
arguments in support of its petition are set forth in Part III of this brief.
In the briefing on Rocky Mountain Power's motion, the following information was
presented to the Court in the briefs.
Heber Light & Power Company, or its predecessor Heber City, has provided retail
electric service to residents and businesses in the Heber Valley for nearly 100 years.
These operations have evolved over the years. They began in 1909 when a hydroelectric
power plant was built on the Provo River north of Heber City. In the 1930's, Heber City,
Midway City, and Charleston Town joined together to form what is now known as the
Heber Light & Power Company. Later, these member municipalities reorganized HLP
under the Utah Interlocal Cooperation Act, Utah Code Ann. §§ 11-13-101, et seq., and
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HLP continues to operate under this Act to the present. As an energy services interlocal
entity, HLP is apolitical subdivision of the State of Utah.
Throughout its existence, HLP has provided electric service to customers both
within the members' municipal boundaries and also in the unincorporated areas of
Wasatch County. HLP has provided this service, in part, because no other electric utility
had the interest or facilities to provide service to customers scattered across the Heber
Valley. HLP has provided this service for many decades without challenge from Rocky
Mountain Power and without any claim of jurisdiction or oversight by the Commission.
The Commission's newly-asserted jurisdiction over governmental entities
dramatically changes the legal environment in which HLP (and all other municipal
utilities) operates and has far-reaching legal implications beyond the specific proceeding
before the Commission. Stated simply, the Commission Order could bring within the
Commission's broad jurisdiction any governmental entity that the Commission concludes
has been "acting like a public utility," subjecting the governmental entity to the full
breadth of Commission jurisdiction under Utah Code Ann. § 54-4-1.
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
I.

The Utah Public Utility Code Does Not Give the Public Service Commission
Jurisdiction Over Governmental Entities, Such As Heber Light & Power
Company.
The Utah Public Service Commission has only the jurisdiction granted it by the

Utah Legislature. The Commission has no jurisdiction, except for jurisdiction
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affirmatively granted by statute. Hi-Country Estates Homeowners Assoc, v. Bagley &
Co., 901 P.2d at 1021. Any statutory grant of authority is narrowly construed and "any
reasonable doubt of the existence of any power [of the Commission] must be resolved
against the exercise thereof." Id. at 1021. "Without clear statutory authority, the
commission cannot pursue even worthy objectives for the public good." Mountain States
Tel and Tel Co. v. Public Service Coinm % 754 P.2d 928, 933 (Utah 1988).
The utility code gives the Commission jurisdiction over public utilities. Utah Code
Ann. § 54-4-1. The code defines the term "public utility" as including "electrical
corporations." Utah Code Ann. § 54-2-1(16). The question here is whether the plain
language of the Commission's statutory grant of jurisdiction includes a governmental
entity, such as HLP, as being an "electrical corporation," and thus a public utility subject
to the Commission jurisdiction. As shown in HLP's argument, HLP, as a governmental
entity, cannot be a public utility.
A.

The Legislature Has Not Affirmatively Granted Commission Jurisdiction
Over Governmental Entities And Has Consistently Excluded Governmental
Entities from the Commission's General Jurisdiction Over Public Utilities.

The utility code does not grant the Commission general jurisdiction over
governmental entities, per se. The Legislature on two occasions has acted expressly to
exclude governmental entities from the definition of a "public utility" subject to
Commission's general jurisdiction. Given the foregoing, the utility code cannot be read
to grant the Commission jurisdiction over governmental entities.
8

B.

HLP Cannot Be a "Corporation" Within the Definition of "Electrical
Corporation" Because the Utility Code Expressly Excludes Governmental
Entities From the Definition of "Corporation."

The utility code's definition of "electrical corporation" includes "corporation."
Utah Code Ann. § 54-2-1(7). The code's definition of "corporation" however expressly
excludes governmental entities from the meaning of "corporation." Utah Code Ann. §§
54-2-l(5)(b). Thus, HLP cannot be a "corporation" within the definition of "electrical
corporation" or "public utility."
C.

HLP Cannot Be A "Person" Within the Definition of "Electrical
Corporation."

The utility code's definition of term "electrical corporation" includes the term
"person." Utah Code Ann. § 54-2-1(7). In 1989, the Legislature amended the definition
to remove the term "governmental entity" from the definition of "person," and thus from
the definition of "electrical corporation." While the 1989 Amendment standing alone is
sufficient to establish the Legislature's intent to exclude governmental entities from
Commission jurisdiction, this intent is further evidenced by the code's definition of
"person" to include "corporation," "association," and "company," which do not include
governmental entities. Thus, HLP is not a "person" with in the definition of "electrical
corporation" or "public utility." definition of "person."
II.

The Commission Erroneously Asserts Jurisdiction Based on Public Policy
Considerations Without a Statutory Grant of Jurisdiction.
The Commission does not identify the statute that purportedly grants it jurisdiction

9

over a governmental entity. Instead of relying on a specific statutory grant of jurisdiction,
the Commission asserted jurisdiction based on an amalgam of "all the statutes governing
interlocals and related statutes, those [statutes] governing Commission jurisdiction, and
case law interpreting these statutes." Commission Order at 19 (R.34). Essentially, the
Commission rewrites the utility code to give the Commission jurisdiction over a
governmental entity. The Commission justifies its actions through unsupported
speculation on the Legislature's intent and a misapplication of the doctrine of in pari
materia, all in derogation of well-established rules of law. Stated simply, the
Commission asserts jurisdiction, without statutory authority, in violation of the rule of law
found in Utah Supreme Court cases and the Commission's own decisions.
III.

The Court Has Jurisdiction To Review The Commission's Order.
A.

The Court Has Jurisdiction to Review the Commission's Order Because the
Order is Final Agency Action.

The Commission's Order is final agency action subject to judicial review. "Final
agency action" is an agency order that has "fully decided" an issue. Union Pacific R.R. v.
Utah State Tax Comm X 2000 UT 401fl3, 999 P.2d 17. Courts adopt a "pragmatic and
flexible" approach in applying the term "final agency action" to a particular agency
decision. Oregon Natural Desert Ass }n v. United States Forest Service, 465 F.3d 977, 982
(9th Cir. 2006). The court thus focuses on "the practical and legal effects" of the agency
decision, and on the "effect of the action . . . not its label." Id. at 982 and 985.
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Of particular importance in assessing this question is the impact of the
Commission's Order on HLP. The Commission Order asserts general jurisdiction over
HLP, not only to resolve the specific issues raised in the Amended Complaint, but also
presumably to supervise and regulate HLP's business as if it were any other "public
utility." Stated simply, to the extent the Commission believes that HLP is acting "like a
public utility," it could presumably impose on HLP the fall breadth of Commission
regulation over regulated public utilities. Commission Order at p. 20. (R.34). Complying
with such jurisdiction will have a broad and costly impact on HLP.
B.

Assuming Arguendo That the Commission Order Is Not Final Agency
Action, the Court Has Jurisdiction to Review the Order in Connection with
the Issuance of an Extraordinary Writ.

If the Court were to determine that the Commission Order is not final agency
action, HLP would be deprived a plain, speedy and adequate remedy for review of the
Commission's assertion of jurisdiction and would be entitled to an extraordinary writ.
Specifically, the very purpose of HLP's appeal is to obtain a judicial determination of
whether HLP can properly be forced to participate in this proceeding. Review after the
completion of the proceeding would thus be ineffectual. Similarly, HLP's business could
be subject to the Commission's general jurisdiction during the pendency of these
proceedings. Additionally, RMP itself has sought an expedited resolution of the
jurisdiction question. For these reasons, the Court should grant HLP a writ, either on its
own motion or on HLP's petition.
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ARGUMENT
I.

The Utah Public Utility Code Does Not Give the Public Service Commission
Jurisdiction Over Governmental Entities, Such As Heber Light & Power
Company.
The Commission has no jurisdiction, except for jurisdiction affirmatively granted

by statute. Hi-Country Estates Homeowners Assoc, v. Bagley & Co., 901 P.2d 1017,
1021 (Utah 1995). Any statutory grant of authority is narrowly construed and "any
reasonable doubt of the existence of any power [of the Commission] must be resolved
against the exercise thereof." Id. at 1021. "Without clear statutory authority, the
commission cannot pursue even worthy objectives for the public good." Mountain States
Tel and Tel Co. v. Public Service Comm 7z, 754 P.2d 928, 933 (Utah 1988).
The utility code gives the Commission jurisdiction over public utilities. Utah Code
Ann. § 54-4-1. The code defines the term "public utility" as including "electrical
corporations." Utah Code Ann. § 54-2-1(16). The question here is whether the plain
language of the Commission's statutory grant of jurisdiction includes a governmental
entity, such as HLP, as being an "electrical corporation," and thus a public utility subject
to the Commission jurisdiction. It is note worthy that the Commission's analysis of the
jurisdiction question does not discuss the statute's plain language. Commission Order
(R.34).
Governmental entities, such as HLP, are excluded from the definition of "electrical
corporation," and thus, as a matter of law, cannot be public utilities subject to
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Commission jurisdiction. In pertinent part, the utility code defines "electrical

>

corporation" as including a "corporation" or "person" owning an electric plant or
furnishing electric power to the public.1 HLP, thus, can only be an electrical corporation
and a public utility subject to Commission jurisdiction if it is a "corporation" or "person."
As discussed below, the Utah Legislature intended to exclude government entities
from Commission jurisdiction. The Legislature's intent is shown by the plain language of
the utility code which precludes a governmental entity, such as HLP, from being either a
"corporation" or a "person," within the definition of "electrical corporation." HLP is thus
not an electrical corporation or a public utility subject to Commission jurisdiction.
A.

The Legislature Has Not Affirmatively Granted Commission
Jurisdiction Over Governmental Entities And Has Consistently
Excluded Governmental Entities from the Commission's General
Jurisdiction Over Public Utilities.

Before considering the utility code's specific language, it is important to recognize
that the utility code does not affirmatively state that governmental entities, per se9 are

1

"Electrical Corporation" is defined in Section 54-2-1(7) which states, in

pertinent part:
"Electrical corporation" includes every corporation, cooperative
association, and person, their lessees, trustees, and receivers, owning,
controlling, operating, or managing any electric plant, or in any way
furnishing electric power for public service or to its consumers or members
for domestic, commercial, or industrial use
The Commission does not claim that HLP is a cooperative association, lessee, trustee or
receiver.
13

"public utilities" subject to the Commission's general jurisdiction. As a result, RMP and
the Commission can only justify including a governmental entity in the definition of
"public utility" by forcing HLP into the definition of "corporation" or "person" and thus
an "electrical corporation" and a "public utility."
In contrast, when the Legislature has dealt with governmental entities, per se, the
Legislature has excluded governmental entities from Commission jurisdiction.
Specifically, the Legislature has expressly excluded governmental entities from the
definition of a "corporation" subject to the Commission's general jurisdiction. Utah
Code Ann. § 54-2-1(5). In addition, the Legislature amended the definition of "person"
to remove governmental entities from the definition of "person" subject to the
Commission's jurisdiction. The Legislature has thus clearly expressed its intent to
exclude governmental entities from the Commission's general jurisdiction.
In this regard, it is worth noting that when the Legislature has intended for the
Commission to have specific jurisdiction over governmental entities it has had no trouble
clearly stating that intent. See generally Utah Code Ann. § 10-18-303(2)(d)(municipal
cable television service provider shall comply with Commission rules); § 11-13304(l)(project entity required to obtain certificate from Commission); § 17B-2a406(1 )(improvement district providing electric service is a public utility subject to
Commission jurisdiction).
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In light of the utility code's plain language discussed more fully below, the Court
should reject RMP's and the Commission's efforts to force a governmental entity, such as
HLP, into the definition of "public utility."
B.

HLP Cannot Be a "Corporation" Within the Definition of "Electrical
Corporation" Because the Utility Code Expressly Excludes
Governmental Entities From the Definition of "Corporation."

The utility code's definition of the term "electrical corporation" includes the term
"corporation." Utah Code Ann. § 54-2-1(7). The code's definition of "corporation"2
however expressly excludes governmental entities from the meaning of "corporation."
Utah Code Ann. §§ 54-2-l(5)(b). It states:
"Corporation" does not include towns, cities, counties, conservancy
districts, improvement districts, or other governmental units created or
organized under any general or special law of this state.
Id. (emphasis supplied). Thus, HLP, as an energy service interlocal entity created under
Utah law, cannot be a "corporation," within the definitions of an "electrical corporation."

2

Section 54-2-1(5) states:

(a) "Corporation" includes an association, and a joint stock company having
any powers or privileges not possessed by individuals or partnerships.
(b) "Corporation" does not include towns, cities, counties, conservancy
districts, improvement districts, or other governmental units created or
organized under any general or special law of this state.
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C.

HLP Cannot Be A "Person" Within the Definition of "Electrical
Corporation."

The utility code's definition of term "electrical corporation" includes the term
"person." Utah Code Ann. § 54-2-1(7) As shown in the following discussion, the
Legislature did not intend to include governmental entities within the definition of
"person." This intent is shown by the Legislature's 1989 amendment removing the term
"governmental entity" from the definition of "person." While the 1989 Amendment
standing alone is sufficient to establish the Legislature's intent, the utility code's
definition of "person" also evidences the Legislature's intent to exclude governmental
entities from the definition of "person." For these reasons, HLP is not a "person" within
the definition of "electrical corporation."
1.

The Term "Person" Does Not Include Governmental Entities
Because the Legislature Removed Term "Governmental Entity"
From the Definition of "Person" in its 1989 Amendment to the
Utility Code.

The Legislature's 1989 amendment to the definition of "person" provides direct,
incontrovertible evidence of the Legislature's intent to exclude governmental entities
from the definition of "person" in the utility code and therefore from the definition of
"electrical corporation." Prior to the amendment, the utility code expressly defined
"person" to include governmental entities.3 The Legislature in 1989 removed the term
3

Prior to the amendment, the utility code defined person as follows:

"Person" includes all individuals, government entities, corporations,
partnerships, associations, trusts, and companies and their lessees, trustees, and
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"governmental entity" from the definition of "person" and the definition now reads:
As used in this chapter, "person" includes all individuals, corporations,
partnerships, associations, trusts, and companies and their lessees, trustees, and
receivers.
Utah Code Ann. § 54-2-2. It is hard to imagine a clearer statement of the Legislature's
intent to exclude governmental entities from the definition of "person," than an
amendment that removes the term "governmental entity" from the definition. Stated in
different words, before the amendment the term "person" included governmental entities,
and after it did not. In light of the amendment removing "governmental entity" from the
definition, the term "person" cannot reasonably be interpreted to include a "governmental
entity," and HLP, as a matter of law, cannot be a person within the definition of
"electrical corporation."
2.

The Plain Language of the Utility Code Does Not Include
Governmental Entities, Such as HLP. In the Definition of "Person."

The 1989 Amendment, standing alone, establishes the Legislature's intent to
exclude governmental entities from the definition of "person." This conclusion is also
supported by the plain language of the statutory definition of "person."
Before the Commission, RMP claimed that HLP is a "person" because HLP is
either a corporation, association, or company. (R.22). While the utility code's definition
receivers.
Utah Code Ann. Section 54-2-1(18)(1988)(emphasis supplied).
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of "person" includes these terms, these terms, as used in the code, do not include
governmental entities.4 Thus, as discussed below, HLP cannot be a corporation,
association or company as used in the definition of "person," and thus is not an electrical
corporation or public utility.
a.

HLP Cannot Be A "Corporation" Within the Definition of
"Person."

The utility code defines "person" as including "corporations." Utah Code Ann. §
54-2-2. As show in Part LB. above, the definition of "corporation" expressly excludes
governmental entities. Thus, HLP, as a governmental entity, cannot be a "corporation"
within the definition of "person."
b.

HLP Cannot Be An "Association" Within the Definition of
"Person."

RMP claims that, even though HLP is a governmental entity, HLP can be a
"person" because it is an "association." (R.22). The utility code does not define the term
"association." It, however, treats the terms "association" and "corporation" as being
coterminous, by defining "corporation" as including "association." Utah Code Ann. § 542-l(5)(a). Because the utility code treats these terms alike, governmental entities must be
excluded from the term "association" as used in the definition of "person." Stated
differently, the legislature did not intend for the term "corporation" to exclude
4

Section 54-2-2 states:

As used in this chapter, "person" includes all individuals, corporations,
partnerships, associations, trusts, and companies and their lessees, trustees, and
receivers.
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governmental entities while having the coterminous term "association" include
governmental entities.
For these reasons, HLP as a governmental entity cannot be an "association" within
the definition of "person."
c.

HLP Cannot Be A "Company" Within the Definition of
"Person."

The code defines "person" to include "company," but does not define the term
"company." Utah Code Ann. § 54-2-2. The dictionary however defines "company" to
include both "corporation" and "association."5 As discussed above, the code defines
"corporation" and "association" as excluding governmental entities. It thus follows that
the term "company" as used in the definition of "person," also excludes governmental
entities.

In sum, the Legislature through its definition of "corporation" and 1989
amendment to the definition of "person" expressed its intent to exclude a governmental
entity, such as HLP, from the definition of a "public utility" subject to the Commission's

5

Black's Law Dictionaiy (8th ed. 2004) at 298, defines "company" to mean:

LA corporation—or, less commonly, an association, partnership, or union—that carries on
a commercial or industrial enterprise. 2. A corporation, partnership, association, joint-stock
company, trust, fund, or organized group of persons, whether incorporated or not, and (in
an official capacity) any receiver, trustee in bankruptcy, or similar official, or liquidating
agent, for any of the foregoing.
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general jurisdiction. This intent is confirmed by the specific statutory language that the
Legislature uses to describe the entities subject to Commission jurisdiction. For these
reasons, the Court should reverse the Commission Order asserting jurisdiction over HLP.
II.

The Commission Erroneously Asserts Jurisdiction Based on Public Policy
Considerations Without a Statutory Grant of Jurisdiction.
The Commission does not identify the statute that purportedly grants it jurisdiction

over a governmental entity. Instead of relying on a specific statutory grant of jurisdiction,
the Commission asserted jurisdiction based on an amalgam of "all the statutes governing
interlocals and related statutes, those [statutes] governing Commission jurisdiction, and
case law interpreting these statutes." Commission Order at 19. (R.34). The Commission's
alchemy is insufficient to transform these statutes into a grant of jurisdiction over a
governmental entity, such as HLP.
In essence and without support in the statutory language, the Commission rewrites
the utility code to give the Commission jurisdiction over a governmental entity. The
Commission justifies its actions through unsupported speculation on the Legislature's
intent and a misapplication of the doctrine of in pari materia, all in derogation of wellestablished rules of law. Stated simply, the Commission asserts jurisdiction, without
statutory authority, and in violation of the rule of law found in Utah Supreme Court cases
and the Commission's own decisions.
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A.

The Commission Does Not Have Jurisdiction Over HLP Because No
Statute Grants the Commission this Jurisdiction.

The Commission has no jurisdiction, except for jurisdiction affirmatively granted
by statute. Hi-Country Estates Homeowners Assoc., 901 P.2d at 1021. Any statutory
grant of authority is narrowly construed and "any reasonable doubt of the existence of any
power [of the Commission] must be resolved against the exercise thereof." Id. at 1021.
"Without clear statutory authority, the commission cannot pursue even worthy objectives
for the public good." Mountain States Tel and Tel Co. v. Public Service Com }n, ISA
P.2d 928,933 (Utah 1988).
The Commission Order forthrightly concedes the absence of a statutory grant of
jurisdiction over HLP. Specifically, the Commission acknowledges that "the Legislature
[has] explicitly failed to speak on subject" of whether the Commission had subject matter
jurisdiction over a municipality's service outside its municipal boundaries. Commission
Order at p. 19-20. (R.34). This finding is consistent with the Commission's earlier
ruling, mln re White City Water Company9133 P.U.R. 4th 62 (Utah P.S.C. 1992), where
the Commission acknowledged that "there may be no explicit statutory authority for us to
assume jurisdiction" over extra-territorial service. Id. at 65, 67.
Since no statute grants the Commission jurisdiction over governmental entities, the
Commission simply lacks jurisdiction over a governmental entity, even if the
governmental entity is acting like a public utility. This follows from the Utah Supreme
Court's ruling in Mountain States. There, the Utah Supreme Court rejected the
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Commission's effort to assert jurisdiction based on Section 54-4-Ts general grant of
jurisdiction, but absent a specific statutory grant. Although Section 54-4-1 broadly grants
the Commission jurisdiction over public utilities, the Court held that it did not provide the
Commission "a limitless right to act as it sees fit" and required a specific grant of
jurisdiction before the Commission could act. Mountain States, 754 P.2d at 930. Finding
no such grant, the Court overruled the Commission's finding that it had jurisdiction.
Following Mountain States, the Commission itself has carefully avoided exercising
jurisdiction not granted by statute. See generally In re Qwest Corp., 2005 WL 4052372
(Utah P.S.C. 2005)("[T]he Commission cannot exercise jurisdiction it does not have,
even if it is expected to produce a worthy result furthering the public interest"); Beaver
County v. Qwest Corp., 2005 WL 1566660 (Utah P.S.C. 2005)(The Commission is not
free to fashion remedies not authorized by statute); Olympus Clinic Inc. v. Qwest Corp.,
2004 WL 1091115 (Utah P.S.C. 2004)("While we recognize that Olympus' complaint
follows an approach cognizable in courts with broad law and equity powers, we are not a
court. Our powers are those conferred by statute enacted by the Legislature.")
Under these precedents, the Commission's determination that a "gap" exists in its
statutory jurisdiction means that the Commission has no jurisdiction. The Commission
ruling that it has jurisdiction, notwithstanding this jurisdictional "gap," violates the rule of
law established by the Utah Supreme Court and the Commission itself. Therefore, the
Court should reverse the Commission's ruling asserting jurisdiction over HLP.
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B.

The Commission Cannot Create Jurisdiction By Rewriting the
Jurisdictional Statute.

The Commission purports to rewrite the jurisdictional statute to fulfill an
unexpressed legislative intent to give the Commission jurisdiction over governmental
entities. The Commission's analysis fails for three reasons. First, the analysis violates
the rules of construction governing statutes granting the Commission jurisdiction.
Second, it is based on speculation concerning legislative intent and contradicts the
statute's language, "the best evidence of legislative intent." Provo City v. Ivie, 2008 UT
App 287 f 4, 191 P.3d 841. Finally, the analysis misapplies the doctrine of in pari
materia. Each of these errors is addressed in turn below.
1.

The Commission Must Narrowly Interpret its Jurisdictional Statute
and Resolve any Doubt Against Exercising Jurisdiction.

As stated above, the Commission has "no inherent regulatory powers other than
those expressly granted or clearly implied by statute." Mountain States, ISA P.2d at 930.
A corollary of this rule is the rule of construction that jurisdictional statutes are narrowly
construed and "any reasonable doubt of the existence of any power [of the Commission]
must be resolved against the exercise thereof." Hi-Country Estates, 901 P.2d at 1021.
These rules require that the Commission narrowly construe its jurisdiction to preclude
jurisdiction not expressly granted.
In the instant case, the Commission has not narrowly interpreted the jurisdictional
statute nor resolved any doubts against the existence of jurisdiction. Instead, the
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Commission's analysis seeks to find jurisdiction regardless of any reasonable doubts and
in spite of the statutory language to the contrary. The Court should reject this analysis as
violating the established rule of law, requiring a statutory basis for jurisdiction and
narrow construction of statutory grants.
2.

The Commission's Speculation About Unexpressed Legislative
Intent Does Not Justify Rewriting the Commission's Jurisdictional
Statute.

The Commission seeks to avoid the lack of a statutory grant of jurisdiction by
speculating on what the Legislature intended, but failed to express in the statutory
language. Commission Order at p. 20. (R.34). The Commission's conclusions about the
Legislature's supposedly true, but unexpressed intent to give the Commission jurisdiction
over governmental entities, has no support in statutory language or other sources. In fact,
the Commission does not specifically identify such sources and betrays a lack of certainty
in its conclusion by stating that the Legislature "seems" to have intended to grant
jurisdiction./^.5
6

The Commission states:

It seems the legislature intended that when an interlocal like HL&P is
acting within the limits of its powers, it is not subject to Commission
jurisdiction.... To the extent it serves those extra-territorial customers, and
to the extent it is acting just like any other public utility, it seems the
legislature intended it would be considered a corporation, association, etc.
and would be subject to commission jurisdiction as would any other public
utility. This seems to be the legislative intent.
Commission Order at 20 (emphasis supplied). (R.34).
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The Commission's analysis of legislative intent ignores "the best evidence of
legislative intent/' the language of the pertinent statutes. Ivie, 2008 UT App at ^J 4. In the
instant case, the pertinent statutory provisions include the definition of "corporation"
excluding governmental entities from Commission jurisdiction and the 1989 Amendment
removing governmental entities from the definition of "person" subject to Commission
jurisdiction. These provisions clearly evidence an intent to exclude governmental entities
from Commission jurisdiction, and in no way evidence an intent to affirmatively grant the
Commission jurisdiction, over governmental entities.
By asserting jurisdiction absent a statutory grant, the Commission has created
jurisdiction "out of whole cloth" violating the established rule of law on determining
legislative intent. Mariemont Corp. v. White City Water Improvement Dist., 958 P.2d
222, 227 (Utah 1998).7
When faced with a question of statutory construction, we look first to the
plain language of the statute. In so doing, we presume that the legislature
used each word advisedly and give effect to each term according to its
ordinary and accepted meaning. We will not infer substantive terms into
the text that are not already there. Rather, the interpretation must be
based on the language used, and [we have] no power to rewrite the
statute to conform to an intention not expressed.

7

"It is one thing for this court to interpret an ambiguous statute and attempt
to harmonize the various provisions of an act, but it is another for this court to fashion a
statutory rule out of whole cloth without having any idea of the legislature's intentions."
Mariemont Corp. v. White City Water Improvement Dist, 958 P.2d 222, 227 (Utah 1998).
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J.J. W. v. Division of Child and Family Services, 2001 UT App 271, ^[ 17? 33 P.3d 59
(emphasis supplied). See also Salt Lake Child and Family Therapy Clinic, Inc. v.
Frederick, 890 P.2d 1017, 1021 (Utah 1995)("While we agree with the concerns
expressed by the dissent, it is not our prerogative to rewrite that section or to question th
wisdom, social desirability, or public policy underlying it.") This rule against rewriting
statutes applies with particular force to statutes governing Commission jurisdiction whic
are narrowly construed. Hi-Country Estates, 901 P.2d at 1021. And, "[I]f a statute is
infirm, 'amendments to correct the inequities should be made by the Legislature and not
by judicial interpretation.'" Frederick, 890 P.2d at 1021.
In part, these errors in the Commission's analysis arise out of the Commission's
confusion of the issue of whether the Commission has jurisdiction over HLP with the
issue of whether HLP has exceeded its authority to serve. The Commission mistakenly
assumes that it has jurisdiction if a governmental entity, such as HLP, has exceeded its
authority to serve. Commission Order at p. 20. (R.34). However, no statute gives the
Commission jurisdiction over a governmental entity, even if the governmental entity
allegedly exceeded its authority to serve. Absent such a statute, the Commission lacks
jurisdiction even if the governmental entity has exceeded its authority. CP National Corj
v. Pub. Service Comm% 638 P.2d 519, 524 (Utah 1981).
This is illustrated by the Utah Supreme Court's decision in CP National. There,
the Utah Supreme Court discussed, in the context of a condemnation proceeding, the
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Commission's jurisdiction over an interlocal entity created by municipalities providing
extraterritorial service. The Court concluded that the Commission did not have
jurisdiction over the interlocal providing such extraterritorial service, even though the
interlocal may have exceeded its authority. CPNational, 638 P.2d at 524. Thus, the
Commission's extensive reliance on CP National is misplaced because that decision
would deny the Commission jurisdiction over HLP's extraterritorial service.
3.

The Commission's Application of the Doctrine of In Pari Materia is
Erroneous and Does Not Support Jurisdiction.

The Commission also seeks to fill the "gap" in the statutes granting it jurisdiction
by relying on the doctrine of in pari materia, a rule of statutory construction. Commission
Order at p. 14-18. (R.34). Rules of statutory construction, however, have no application
where, as here, the plain language of the statute is clear and unambiguous. Frederick, 890
P.2d at 1020. In addition, as discussed below, the Commission analysis does not support
a finding of jurisdiction and misapplies this rule of statutory construction.
Under the doctrine ofinpari materia ("in the same matter"), statutes which "relate
to the same person or thing, to the same class of persons or things, or have the same
purpose or object" are construed together. J J. W., 2001 UT App at \ 22. This rule of
construction however only applies where the statutes are related to the same matter and is
not applied to create substantive terms that are not found in the statutory language. Id. at
123.
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Under the doctrine of in pari materia, the Commission relies on provisions of the
Utah Municipal Code and the Utah Interlocal Cooperation Act to aid in its construction of
its jurisdiction under the utility code.8 These statutes however concern only the authority
of municipalities and interlocal entities. They have nothing to do with the Commission's
jurisdiction. These statutes are thus not in pari materia with respect to the Commission's
jurisdiction and provide no guidance on the proper construction of the Commission's
jurisdiction under Section 54-4-1 of the utility code.
Even if the statutes were in pari materia, which they are not, the doctrine could not
be used to create substantive terms that have no support in the statute's language. J J. W.,
2001 UT App at f 23. Stated differently, under the doctrine of in pari materia, an unclear
statute may be construed in the light of other similar statutes, but new terms cannot be
created from whole cloth. Thus, under this doctrine, the Commission cannot construe
Section 54-4-1 to give it jurisdiction over a governmental entity, because the plain
language of Section 54-4-1 does not support such a grant.
Finally, the Commission concludes its discussion of in pari materia by stating that
these other statutes "do not preclude the Commission's jurisdiction over an entity like
HL&P when its operations or activities exceed those delineated by statute." Commission
Order at p. 18. (R.34). This statement is accurate because the statutes do not deal with
8

The Commission asserts that Section 10-8-14(1) of the Utah Municipal
Code and Sections 11-13-213 and 11-13-203 of the Utah Interlocal Cooperation Act are
in pari materia for the purposes of construing the Commissions jurisdictional statute.
Commission Order at p. 15, 17-18. (R.34).
28

Commission jurisdiction at all and thus do not preclude jurisdiction. It is irrelevant
because Commission jurisdiction must be based on an affirmative statutory grant of
authority which the statutes do not provide and because the jurisdiction must be narrowly
construed. The Commission's reliance on the doctrine of in pari material thus does not
support its finding of jurisdiction.

In sum, the Commission has no authority or jurisdiction unless provided by statute.
The Commission concedes that no statute expressly gives it jurisdiction over a
governmental entity, such as HLP. This "gap" was, in part, created by the Legislature's
decision to exclude governmental entities from the definition of "corporation" and
"person" subject to Commission jurisdiction. Rather than simply accepting this "gap" as
the will of the Legislature, as it must under established legal principles, the Commission
erroneously rewrites the statute to include jurisdiction over governmental entities. Thus,
the Commission ruling violates the rule of law and should be reversed.
III.

The Court Has Jurisdiction To Review The Commission's Order.
RMP has filed a motion to dismiss this appeal for lack of jurisdiction because the

Commission Order is not final agency action. After the issue had been briefed, the Court
deferred ruling on the issue of the Court's jurisdiction until the parties' plenary
presentation of the merits. The Court further stated that the parties may choose to rest on
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the briefs submitted on the jurisdiction issue or may address the matter as they see fit in
briefing and/or at argument.
With this background, HLP will in this section of the brief present two arguments
on the jurisdiction question. The first is that the Commission's Order is final agency
action. This argument will be for all practical purposes identical to the argument
presented in HLP's response to RMP's motion to dismiss and is restated here hopefully
for the convenience of the Court. The second argument is that, if the Commission's
Order is not final agency action, the Court retains jurisdiction to review the Commission's
Order in connection with the issuance of an extraordinary writ.
A.

The Court Has Jurisdiction to Review the Commission's Order
Because the Order is Final Agency Action.

The Commission's Order is final agency action subject to judicial review. "Final
agency action" is an agency order that has "fully decided" an issue. Union Pacific R.R. v.
Utah State Tax Comm % 2000 UT 40,113, 999 P.2d 17. If an agency action disposes
"completely of discrete issues in one order while leaving other issues for later orders," the
agency action is deemed final "as to any issue fully decided." Id.9 This rule assures that
9

The Utah Supreme Court linked this rule to the "nature of agency

proceedings":
Because of the nature of agency proceedings, final actions
often take place seriatim, disposing completely of discrete
issues in one order while leaving other issues for later orders.
Such orders will be final as to any issue fully decided by that
order and appealable any time from the date of that order to
the last day to appeal the last final agency action in the case.
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the Court only reviews "a definitive act of an agency," an act which is "closed, discrete,
and focused." 33 Charles Alan Wright & Arthur R. Miller, Federal Practice and
Procedure § 8397 (May 2009). The Commission Order is this type of agency action.
The Utah Supreme Court relied on federal law on final agency action in
developing a standard for determining whether an agency action is final agency action.
Union Pacific, 2000 UT at f 14, quoting Port of Boston Marine Terminal Ass 'n v.
Rederiaktiebolaget Transatlantic, 400 U.S. 62, 71 (1970). Federal law adopts a
"pragmatic and flexible" approach in applying the term "final agency action" to a
particular agency decision. Oregon Natural Desert Ass 'n v. United States Forest Service,
465 F.3d 977, 982 (9th Cir. 2006). The court thus focuses on "the practical and legal
effects" of the agency decision, and on the "effect of the action . . . riot its label." Id. at
982 and 985.
Against this backdrop, the Utah Supreme Court adopted a three-part standard for
determining whether an agency action is "final agency action." Union Pacific, 2000 UT
at l[[16. The Commission's Order satisfies the Union Pacific factors because: (1) the
Commission has "fully decided" the legal issue of whether a governmental entity is a
"public utility" subject to Commission jurisdiction and judicial review will thus not
disrupt the Commission's decision making on this issue, (2) the Commission's Order has
the potential for immediate and dramatic legal consequences on HLP's business, and (3)
Barker v. Utah Public Service Comm % 970 P.2d 702, 706 (Utah 1998).
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the Commission Order is not preliminary. Each of these grounds for denial of RMPs
motion is addressed in turn below.
1.

Judicial Review Will Not Disrupt the Orderly Process of
Adjudication Because the Commission "Has Reached the End of its
Decision Making Process" on the Jurisdiction Issue.

The first Union Pacific factor is whether judicial review will disrupt the orderly
process of adjudication. Resolution of this issue turns on whether the agency has
"reached the end of its decision making process" on the issue subject to the agency order.
Ameritemps, Inc. v. Labor Comm'n, 2005 UT App 491, ^}20, 128 P.3d 31.
In Ameritemps, an employer sought judicial review of a Utah Labor Commission
Appeals Board finding of permanent total disability, but leaving for a later agency action,
a hearing on a reemployment plan. The Court of Appeals found that judicial review
would not disrupt the orderly process of administrative adjudication because the issue of
whether the employee "was permanently totally disabled was disposed of completely by
the Board," even though other issues remained to be resolved. Ameritemps, 2005 UT
App at Tf 20. Moreover, the Board had signaled the completion of the administrative
process by refusing to reconsider its prior order. Id. at f 20.
Applying Ameritemps to the Commission's jurisdiction ruling, it is clear that
judicial review of the Commission Order on jurisdiction would not disrupt the orderly
process of administrative decision making. The Commission has "reached the end of its
decision making process" on the issue of whether, as a matter of law, a governmental
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entity can be a public utility subject to Commission jurisdiction. There is nothing further
for the Commission to do with respect to this issue and, as in Ameritemps, the
Commission has refused to reconsider the ruling on jurisdiction.
RMP claims that judicial review will disrupt the orderly process of adjudication
because a number of factual issues (such as the existence of a surplus or RMP's
abandonment of its certificate) remain to be resolved by the Commission. The
Commission's resolution of these factual issues, however, will not change the
Commission's ruling that, as a matter of law, a governmental entity can be subject to
Commission jurisdiction as a public utility. The existence of these factual disputes does
not prevent the Commission's jurisdictional ruling from being a final order, since that
ruling completely disposed of the jurisdiction issue, as a matter of law, and will not be
affected by resolution of the remaining, unrelated factual issues.
2.

The Commission's Newlv-Asserted Jurisdiction Over Governmental
Entities Has Potential for Dramatic Legal Consequences For HLP
and Will Significantly Affect its Rights and Obligations.

The second Union Pacific factor is drawn from the United States Supreme Court's
decision in Port of Boston. There, the court held that a relevant consideration in
determining the finality of agency action was "whether rights or obligations have been
determined or legal consequences will flow from the agency action." Port of Boston, 400
U.S. at 71. The Commission Order has such legal consequences because it alters the legal
regime under which HLP operates, Bennett v. Spear, 520 U.S. 154, i78 (1997), and could
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significantly affect and disrupt HLP's day-to-day operations. Oregon Natural Desert
^>z,465F.3dat987.
The Commission's newly-asserted and dramatic expansion of its jurisdiction over
governmental entities has broad legal implications for HLP (and other municipal utilities)
beyond the pending proceeding before the Commission. The Commission Order asserts
general jurisdiction over HLP, not only to resolve the specific issues raised in the
Amended Complaint, but also presumably to supervise and regulate HLP's business as if
it were any other public utility. Stated simply, to the extent the Commission believes that
HLP is acting "like a public utility," it could presumably impose on HLP the full breadth
of Commission regulation over regulated public utilities. Commission Order at p. 20.
(R.34).
It cannot be gainsaid that exposure to such regulation has immediate legal
implications for HLP and will dramatically affect its day-to-day business. Utah Code
Ann. §54-7-10(1) (Commission orders are effective and operative on the date issued).
The Commission Order drastically alters the legal regime under which HLP has operated
for a century because HLP is no longer excluded, as a matter of law, from Commission
jurisdiction. Even though it has always acted free of any Commission regulation, HLP's
operations could now become subject to scrutiny and control as if it were or could be a
"public utility." Additionally, HLP could now be required: to obtain Commission
approval before increasing its rates or terms of service to existing customers (U.C.A. §§
54-3-2, 54-4-4 (rates), U.C.A. §§ 54-3-2, 54-4-7, 54-4-18 (service); to adopt the
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Commission's system of accounts (U.C.A. §§ 54-4-21, 54-4-23); to obtain Commission
consent before issuing securities, or entering construction or purchase contracts (U.C.A. §
54-4-31 (securities), U.C.A. § 54-4-26 (contracts)); and to conform to all Commission
orders and regulations applicable to public utilities (U.C.A. § 54-3-23). See also Title
R746 regulations promulgated by the PSC. These same costs would befall other
municipalities as well.
HLP can presumably avoid the Commission's newly-asserted jurisdiction only by
discontinuing service to existing customers or by refusing to provide service to new
customers in the unincorporated areas, even though no other service provider is presently
able to provide service to most of these customers. Such a result would have dramatic
and far-reaching implications not only for HLP but also for thousands of residents of the
Heber Valley. These legal consequences are the very types of legal consequences that the
United States Supreme Court considered sufficient to establish final agency action in
Bennett v. Spear, 520 U.S. 154 (1997).
The agency action in Bennett was a Biological Opinion issued by the Fish and
Wildlife Service ("Service") on the Klamath Irrigation Project ("Project") under the
Endangered Species Act. Id. at 159. The Biological Opinion explained how Project
operations may jeopardize endangered species and critical habitat and identified how
maintaining minimum water levels in certain reservoirs could avoid these consequences.
Id. The Bureau of Reclamation, the Project operator, notified the Service that it would
operate the Project in compliance with the Biological Opinion. Id.
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Irrigation districts and ranches receiving Project water then filed suit against the
Service challenging the Biological Opinion. Bennett, 520 U.S. at 159. The Bureau was
not named as a party. Id. The complaint alleged that "the restrictions on water delivery
'recommended' by the Biological Opinion 'adversely affect plaintiffs by substantially
reducing the quantity of available irrigation water/" Id. at 160. The petitioner's claims
were brought under both the Endangered Species Act and the Administrative Procedures
Act. Id at 161.
Under the Administrative Procedures Act, the Court found that the Biological
Opinion was final agency action because of the potential legal consequences flowing
from the Service's action. Bennett, 520 U.S. 178. In the Court's words, the Biological
Opinion "alter[ed] the legal regime" under which the Bureau operated the Project. Id.
The Court's conclusion was based, in part, on the "powerful coercive effect" of the
Biological Opinion on the Bureau, even though the Biological Opinion served only an
"advisory function," and did not bind the Bureau which was "technically free to disregard
the Biological Opinion and proceed with its proposed action." Bennett, 520 U.S. at 169,
170. While the Bureau could disagree and disregard the Biological Opinion, the Court
noted that it must "articulate its reasons for disagreement (which ordinarily requires
species and habitat investigations that are not within the action agency's expertise),...
[and] runs a substantial risk if its (inexpert) reasons turn out to be wrong." Id. at 169.
Thus, the Court concluded that the Biological Opinion altered the legal regime under
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which the Bureau operated and had legal consequences making the opinion final agency
action.
Even more so than the agency action in Bennett, the Commission's newly-asserted
jurisdiction over governmental entities in this case dramatically alters the legal regime
under which HLP and other municipal utilities have operated for a century. The
Commission Order thus has legal consequences more than sufficienl under the Union
Pacific standard for constituting final agency action.
3.

The Commission Order Completely Disposes of the Jurisdictional
Issue and Is Not A Preliminary, Preparatory. Procedural or
Intermediate Decision.

The final Union Pacific factor is whether the agency action is "a preliminary,
preparatory, procedural, or intermediate decision with regard to subsequent agency
action." Union Pacific, 2000 UT at f 16. In the instant case, the Commission Order is not
preliminary to subsequent agency action, even though other issues remain to be resolved
in the proceeding. As in Ameritemps, the Commission's decision on jurisdiction ''ended
the decision making process at the agency level on this issue," despite the fact that the
Commission had other issues to resolve in the proceeding. Ameritemps, 2005 UT App. at
123.
In addition, the Commission Order is clearly not "preliminary" with respect to its
potential effects on HLP. The Commission Order "takes[s] effect and become[s]
operative on the date issued." Utah Code Ann. §54-7-10(1). For the reasons presented
above, the Commission's dramatic extension of jurisdiction over governmental entities
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has far-reaching legal consequences for HLP, and other municipalities regardless of
nature of the Commission's subsequent rulings on remaining issues. This is what
distinguishes the instant case from Barney v. Div. of Occupational & Professional
Licensing, 828 P.2d 542 (Utah Ct.App. 1992), in which the ruling on jurisdiction had no
independent affect other than to set the stage for an adjudication.

In sum, the Commission's decision satisfies each of the Union Pacific factors and
is thus final agency action.
B.

Assuming Arguendo That the Commission Order Is Not Final Agency
Action, the Court Has Jurisdiction to Review the Order in Connection
with the Issuance of an Extraordinary Writ

This Court has jurisdiction to issue all extraordinary writs. Utah Code Ann. § 78A3-102(2). Included among these extraordinary writs are writs to protect a party where an
agency has exceeded its jurisdiction, or failed to perform an act required by law. Utah R.
Civ. P. 65B(d)(2). Assuming arguendo that the Court lacks jurisdiction because the
Commission's Order is not final agency action, this Court should retain jurisdiction to
review the Commission's assertion of jurisdiction in determining whether to grant an
extraordinary writ. Gallivan v. Walker, 2002 UT 73, ^ 4 , 54 P.3d 1066.
While HLP has filed a Petition for Extraordinary Writ, the Court may treat HLP's
Petition for Review as a petition for an extraordinary writ. See generally Gallivan, 2002
UT at ^f 4 (treating a denied statutory petition, as a petition for extraordinary writ). This is
particularly true, where, as in the instant case, the appeal concerns a purely legal question
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of first impression with potentially far-reaching implications. Id. See also Utah R. App.
P. 46(a)(4)(issue raised "has not been, but should be settled by the Supreme Court) and
State v. Barrett, 2005 UT 88, \ 24, 127 P.3d 682(applying Appellate Rule 46 to request
for extraordinary writ under Civil Rule 65B(d)).
In determining whether an extraordinary writ is appropriate, the Court must
consider multiple factors, including whether the petitioner has an plain, speedy and
adequate remedy. Barrett, 2005 UT at % 24. As discussed below, these factors support
the Court retaining jurisdiction to grant an extraordinary writ.
1.

HLP Cannot Obtain a Plain. Speedy, and Adequate Remedy Through
An Appeal of the Commission's Assertion of Jurisdiction After a
Trial on the Merits.

The Commission Order adopts a new and expansive interpretation of the
Commission's jurisdiction which could have far-reaching implications for all Utah
governmental entities, and could have immediate and detrimental impacts on HLP's
business. Stated simply, the Commission Order could bring within the Commission's
broad jurisdiction any governmental entity that the Commission concludes has been
"acting like a public utility," subjecting the governmental entity to the full breadth of
Commission jurisdiction under Utah Code Ann. § 54-4-1. Commission Order at p. 20.
(R. 34).
If this Court dismisses this appeal, the Commission could exercise is general
authority to direct HLP to make fundamental changes to HLP's business or structure.
Such action would essentially render meaningless a subsequent Utah Supreme Court
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ruling that the Commission lacked jurisdiction. Thus, this Court's ruling on the
Commission's jurisdiction would farther the substantial interests of HLP and its
customers because HLP would not be forced to modify its century-long method of
operation and long-existing stmcture just to avoid the Commission's claim of jurisdiction,
a modification which would be difficult to reverse and may render hollow a Utah
Supreme Court ruling that the Commission lacked jurisdiction.
2.

HLP's Forced Participation in This Adjudicatory Proceeding Would
Preclude HLP From Obtaining Meaningful Judicial Review of the
Commission Order.

Unless the Court retains jurisdiction to review the Commission's Order, the
Commission's Order arguably subjects HLP to immediate Commission jurisdiction.
HLP would be required to participate in the Commission proceedings as if the
Commission has jurisdiction. However, the very purpose of HLP's appeal is to obtain a
judicial determination of whether HLP can properly be forced to participate in this
proceeding. Plainly, if HLP is forced to participate in these proceedings, any later ruling
by this Court rejecting Commission jurisdiction would amount to closing the barn door
after the horse had gotten away. In other words, an appeal to this Court following a
plenary hearing before the Commission would not provide HLP with meaningful judicial
review of the Commission's assertion of jurisdiction.
The instant case is similar to Southwestern Bell Tel Co. v. Public Utility Comm %
72 S.W.3d 23 (Tx. App. 2001). There, AT&T filed an action in the Texas Public Utility
Commission (*TUC") against Southwestern Bell Telephone Company ("SWBT")
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challenging SWBT's charges to AT&T. Id. at 27. The PUC issued a preliminary order
evidencing its intent to proceed with an adjudicatory hearing. SWBT filed a court action
challenging PUC jurisdiction to modify SWBT rates or to conduct a hearing on those
rates. Id. at 28-29. SWBT also requested "a temporary injunction restraining the PUC
pendente lite from reducing the charges and from holding an adjudicative hearing for that
purpose." Id. The court denied the temporary order and SWBT filed an interlocutory
appeal.
On appeal, the Texas Appellate court found that continuation of the PUC
proceeding pending judicial review would cause SWBT irreparable injury that justified
the temporary order staying the PUC proceedings. It held:
If SWBTs contentions are ultimately sustained by the district court, after a
trial on the merits, it will be a meaningless and hollow victory if the agency
has in the period before trial conducted a hearing and reduced the current
amount of SWBT's switched-access charges, thereby extinguishing SWBT's
claimed rights by actions the district court will have held ultra vires and
unlawful. It appears to us then that a temporary injunction is the only
practical and effective remedy to prevent such an eventuality. The statutory
rights claimed by SWBT, if they exist, are larger than and different in
character from a moral right to be free from the mere expense associated
with a hearing before the PUC. The substance of SWBTvs claimed rights
is a right to be free of agency regulation in particulars the legislature
has reserved for itself as the sovereign's immediate representatives. It
seems to us then that the rights claimed bv SWBT cannot be measured
bv a pecuniary standard or compensated by money if destroyed by
unlawful agency action.
Id. at 30 (italics in original, additional emphasis added).
In the instant proceeding, HLP faces the very same type of irreparable injury that
SWBT faced in the Southwestern Bell case. As in that case, HLP claims u a right to be
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free of agency regulation in particulars the legislature has reserved," i.e., a right to be free
from the Commission proceedings. If this Court does not resolve the Commission's
jurisdiction and HLP is forced to participate the Commission's proceedings, HLP will
have effectively lost the right to be free of Commission jurisdiction, even if, later, this
Court were ultimately to determine that the Commission erred in asserting jurisdiction.
Thus, the Court should rule on the extent of the Commission jurisdiction to allow for
meaningful review of the Commission Order.
3.

The Commission's Assertion of Jurisdiction May Also Immediately
Impact HLP's Business To the Determent of HLP and its Customers.

As discussed in Part III.A.2., above, the Commission's newly-asserted and
dramatic expansion of its jurisdiction over governmental entities has extremely broad
legal implications for HLP (and other municipal utilities) beyond the pending proceeding
before the Commission. For these reasons, the public interest, as well as HLP's interest, is
clearly furthered by immediate judicial review that avoids or minimizes the disruption of
HLP's operations in Wasatch County.
4.

RMP's Interest Are Not Adversely Affected Bv A Court Ruling On
The Question of the Commission's Jurisdiction.

In this appeal, RMP has filed a Motion for Expedite Review, arguing the
importance of resolving the merits of the issues raised in the complaint and answer. See
generally RMP's Memorandum in Support of Motion to Expedite Review at p. 5. The
parties agree about the advantage of a quick resolution of the merits. Such a quick
resolution however would not be accomplished by discovery and an evidentiary
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proceeding in a forum which does not have jurisdiction. Thus, the interests of RMP
would be furthered by the Court retaining jurisdiction over this appeal to determine the
Commission's jurisdiction to resolve the merits.
CONCLUSION
For the reasons set forth here, the Court should retain jurisdiction and reverse the
Commission's Order asserting jurisdiction over HLP.
Dated this

day of May, 2009.

jFps^ph T. Dunbeck, Jr.
Gary A. Dodge
Attorneys for Heber Light & Power
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c
West's Utah Code Annotated Currentness
Title 10. Utah Municipal Code
*(1 Chapter 8. Powers and Duties of Municipalities
*g Article 1. General Powers
-f § 10-8-14. Water, sewer, gas, electricity, and public transportation—Service beyond city limits-Retainage—Cable television and public telecommunications services
(1) A city may:
(a) construct, maintain, and operate waterworks, sewer collection, sewer treatment systems, gas works, electric light works, telecommunications lines, cable television lines, or public transportation systems;
(b) authorize the construction, maintenance and operation of the works or systems listed in Subsection (l)(a)
by others;
(c) purchase or lease the works or systems listed in Subsection (l)(a) from any person or corporation; and
(d) sell and deliver the surplus product or service capacity of any works or system listed in Subsection (l)(a),
not required by the city or the city's inhabitants, to others beyond the limits of the city, except the sale and delivery of cable television services or public telecommunications services is governed by Subsection (3).
(2) If any payment on a contract with a private person, firm, or corporation to construct waterworks, sewer collection, sewer treatment systems, gas works, electric light works, telecommunications lines, cable television
lines, or public transportation systems is retained or withheld, it shall be retained or withheld and released as
provided in Section 13-8-5.
(3) A city's actions under this section related to works or systems involving public telecommunications services
or cable television services are subject to the requirements of Chapter 18, Municipal Cable Television and Public Telecommunications Services Act.
CREDIT(S)
Laws 1911, c. 120, § 1; Laws 1915, c. 100, § 1; Laws 1969, c. 28, § 1; Laws 1983, c. 60, § 2; Laws 1999, c. 365,
§ 2, eff. May 3, 1999; Laws 2001, c. 83, § 1, eff. March 13, 2001.
Codifications R.S. 189.8, § 26, subd. 14; C.L. 1907, § 26, subd. 14; C.L. 1917, § 570x14; R.S. 1933, § 15-8-14;
C. 1943, § 15-8-14.
Current through 2008 Second Special Session, including results from the November 2008 General Election.
Copr (c) 2008 Thomson Reuters/West. No claim to orig. U.S. govt.
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West's Utah Code Annotated Currentness
Title 10. Utah Municipal Code
*ji Chapter 18. Municipal Cable Television and Public Telecommunications Services Act
*§| Part 3. Operational Requirements and Limitations
-f § 10-18-303. General operating limitations
A municipality that provides a cable television service or a public telecommunications service under this chapter
is subject to the operating limitations of this section.
(1) A municipality that provides a cable television service shall comply with:
(a) the Cable Communications Policy Act of 1984,47 U.S.C. 521, et seq.; and
(b) the regulations issued by the Federal Communications Commission under the Cable Communications
Policy Act of 1984, 47 U.S.C. 521, et seq.
(2) A municipality that provides a public telecommunications service shall comply with:
(a) the Telecommunications Act of 1996, Pub. L. 104-104; [FN1]
(b) the regulations issued by the Federal Communications Commission under the Telecommunications Act of
1996, Pub. L. 104-104;
(c) Section 54-8b-2.2 relating to:
(i) the interconnection of essential facilities; and
(ii) the purchase and sale of essential services; and
(d) the rules made by the Public Service Commission of Utah under Section 54-8b-2.2.
(3) A municipality may not cross subsidize its cable television services or its public telecommunications services
with:
(a) tax dollars;
(b) income from other municipal or utility services;
(c) below-market rate loans from the municipality; or
(d) any other means.
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(4)(a) A municipality may not make or grant any undue or unreasonable preference or advantage to itself or to
any private provider of:
(i) cable television services; or
(ii) public telecommunications services.
(b) A municipality shall apply without discrimination as to itself and to any private provider the municipality's
ordinances, rules, and policies, including those relating to:
(i) obligation to serve;
(ii) access to public rights of way;
(iii) permitting;
(iv) performance bonding;
(v) reporting; and
(vi) quality of service.
(c) Subsections (4)(a) and (b) do not supersede the exception for a rural telephone company in Section 251 of
the Telecommunications Act of 1996, Pub. L. 104-104.
(5) In calculating the rates charged by a municipality for a cable television service or a public telecommunications service, the municipality:
(a) shall include within its rates an amount equal to all taxes, fees, and other assessments that would be applicable to a similarly situated private provider of the same services, including:
(i) federal, state, and local taxes;
(ii) franchise fees;
(iii) permit fees;
(iv) pole attachment fees; and
(v) fees similar to those described in Subsections (5)(a)(i) through (iv); and
(b) may not price any cable television service or public telecommunications service at a level that is less than
the sum of:
(i) the actual direct costs of providing the service;
(ii) the actual indirect costs of providing the service; and
(iii) the amount determined under Subsection (5)(a).
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(6)(a) A municipality that provides cable television services or public telecommunications services shall establish and maintain a comprehensive price list of all cable television services or public telecommunications services offered by the municipality.
(b) The price list required by Subsection (6)(a) shall:
(i) include all terms and conditions relating to the municipality providing each cable television service or
public telecommunications service offered by the municipality;
(ii) be published in a newspaper having general circulation in the municipality; and
(iii) be available for inspection:
(A) at a designated office of the municipality; and
(B) during normal business hours.
(c) At least five days before the date a change to a municipality's price list becomes effective, the municipality
shall:
(i) notify the following of the change:
(A) all subscribers to the services for which the price list is being changed; and
(B) any other persons requesting notification of any changes to the municipality's price list; and
(ii) publish notice in a newspaper of general circulation in the municipality.
(d) If there is no newspaper of general circulation in the municipality, the municipality shall publish the notice
required by this Subsection (6) in a newspaper of general circulation that is nearest the municipality.
(e) A municipality may not offer a cable television service or a public telecommunications service except in
accordance with the prices, terms, and conditions set forth in the municipality's price list.
(7) A municipality may not offer to provide or provide cable television services or public telecommunications
services to a subscriber that does not reside within the geographic boundaries of the municipality.
(8)(a) A municipality shall keep accurate books and records of the municipality's:
(i) cable television services; and
(ii) public telecommunications services.
(b) The books and records required to be kept under Subsection (8)(a) are subject to legislative audit to verify
the municipality's compliance with the requirements of this chapter including:
(i) pricing;
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(ii) recordkeeping; and
(iii) antidiscrimination.
(9) A municipality may not receive distributions from the Universal Public Telecommunications Service Support
Fund established in Section 54-8b-15.
CREDIT(S)
Laws 2001, c. 83, § 14, eff. March 13, 2001.
[FN1] See 47 U.S.C.A. § 151 et seq.
Current through 2008 Second Special Session, including results from the November 2008 General Election.
Copr (c) 2008 Thomson ReutersAVest. No claim to orig. U.S. govt.
END OF DOCUMENT
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West's Utah Code Annotated Currentness
Title 11. Cities, Counties, and Local Taxing Units
*S Chapter 13. Interlocal Cooperation Act (Refs & Annos)
*S Part 2. Public Agencies Joint Exercise of Powers
-f § 11-13-203. Interlocal entities-Agreement to create an interlocal entity—Utah interlocal entity
may become electric interlocal entity or energy services interlocal entity
(1) An interlocal entity is:
(a) separate from the public agencies that create it;
(b) a body politic and corporate; and
(c) a political subdivision of the state.
(2) Any two or more Utah public agencies may enter into an agreement to create a Utah interlocal entity to accomplish the purpose of their joint or cooperative action, including undertaking and financing a facility or improvement to provide the service contemplated by that agreement.
(3)(a) A Utah public agency and one or more public agencies may enter into an agreement to create an electric
interlocal entity to accomplish the purpose of their joint or cooperative action if that purpose is to participate in
the undertaking or financing of:
(i) facilities to provide additional project capacity;
(ii) common facilities under Title 54, Chapter 9, Electric Power Facilities Act; or
(iii) electric generation or transmission facilities.
(b) By agreement with one or more public agencies that are not parties to the agreement creating it, a Utah interlocal entity may be reorganized as an electric interlocal entity if:
(i) the public agencies that are parties to the agreement creating the Utah interlocal entity authorize, in the
same manner required to amend the agreement creating the Utah interlocal entity, the Utah interlocal entity
to be reorganized as an electric interlocal entity; and
(ii) the purpose of the joint or cooperative action to be accomplished by the electric interlocal entity meets
the requirements of Subsection (3)(a).
(4)(a) Two or more Utah public agencies may enter into an agreement with one another or with one or more
public agencies to create an energy services interlocal entity to accomplish the purposes of their joint and co-
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operative action with respect to facilities, services, and improvements necessary or desirable with respect to the
acquisition, generation, transmission, management, and distribution of electric energy for the use and benefit of
the public agencies that enter into the agreement.
(b)(i) A Utah interlocal entity that was created to facilitate the transmission or supply of electric power may,
by resolution adopted by its governing body, elect to become an energy services interlocal entity.
(ii) Notwithstanding Subsection (4)(b)(i), a Utah interlocal entity that is also a project entity may not elect
to become an energy services interlocal entity.
(iii) An election under Subsection (4)(b)(i) does not alter, limit, or affect the validity or enforceability of a
previously executed contract, agreement, bond, or other obligation of the Utah interlocal entity making the
election.
CREDIT(S)
Laws 1977, c. 47, § 3; Laws 1985, c. 143, § 2; Laws 1987, c. 188, § 1; Laws 1989, c. 41, § 2; Laws 1989, 2nd
Sp.Sess., c. 5, § 2; Laws 1991, c. 141, § 1; Laws 1992, c. 30, § 17; Laws 1995, c. 203, § 1, eff. May 1, 1995;
Laws 1996, c. 207, § 1, eff. April 29, 1996; Laws 1997, c. 234, § 2, eff. May 5,1997; Laws 1998, c. 337, § 12,
eff. May 4, 1998; Laws 2002, c. 286, § 8, eff. May 6, 2002; Laws 2005, c. 233, § 11, eff. May 2,2005.
Codifications C. 1953, § 11-13-5.5.
Current through 2008 Second Special Session, including results from the November 2008 General Election.
Copr (c) 2008 Thomson Reuters/West. No claim to orig. U.S. govt.
END OF DOCUMENT
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c
West's Utah Code Annotated Currentness
Title 11. Cities, Counties, and Local Taxing Units
* ! Chapter 13. Interlocal Cooperation Act (Refs & Annos)
*(1 Part 2. Public Agencies Joint Exercise of Powers
.+ § 11-13-213. Agreements for joint ownership, operation, or acquisition of facilities or improvements
Any two or more public agencies may make agreements between or among themselves:
(1) for the joint ownership of any one or more facilities or improvements which they have authority by law to
own individually;
(2) for the joint operation of any one or more facilities or improvements which they have authority by law to operate individually;
(3) for the joint acquisition by gift, grant, purchase, construction, condemnation or otherwise of any one or more
such facilities or improvements and for the extension, repair or improvement thereof;
(4) for the exercise by an interlocal entity of its powers with respect to any one or more facilities or improvements and the extensions, repairs, or improvements of them; or
(5) any combination of the foregoing.
CREDIT(S)
Laws 1965, c. 14, § 15; Laws 1977, c. 47, § 6; Laws 2002, c. 286, § 18, eff. May 6,2002.
Codifications C. 1953, § 11-13-15.
Current through 2008 Second Special Session, including results from the November 2008 General Election.
Copr (c) 2008 Thomson Reuters/West. No claim to orig. U.S. govt.
END OF DOCUMENT
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c
West's Utah Code Annotated Currentness
Title 11. Cities, Counties, and Local Taxing Units
*ii Chapter 13. Interlocal Cooperation Act (Refs & Annos)
*y Part 3. Project Entity Provisions
-• § 11-13-304. Certificate of public convenience and necessity required-Exceptions
(1) Before proceeding with the construction of any electrical generating plant or transmission line, each interlocal entity and each out-of-state public agency shall first obtain from the public service commission a certificate,
after hearing, that public convenience and necessity requires such construction and in addition that such construction will in no way impair the public convenience and necessity of electrical consumers of the state of Utah
at the present time or in the future.
(2) The requirement to obtain a certificate of public convenience and necessity applies to each project initiated
after the section's effective date [FN1] but does not apply to:
(a) a project for which a feasibility study was initiated prior to the effective date;
(b) any facilities providing additional project capacity; or
(c) transmission lines required for the delivery of electricity from a project described in Subsection (2)(a) or
facilities providing additional project capacity within the corridor of a transmission line, with reasonable deviation, of a project producing as of April 21,1987.
CREDIT(S)
Laws 1977, c. 47, § 11; Laws 1987, c. 188, § 4; Laws 2002, c. 286, § 32, eff. May 6, 2002.
Codifications C. 1953, § 11-13-27.
[FN1] Laws 1977, c. 47, effective May 10, 1977.
Current through 2008 Second Special Session, including results from the November 2008 General Election.
Copr (c) 2008 Thomson Reuters/West. No claim to orig. U.S. govt.
END OF DOCUMENT
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West's Utah Code Annotated Currentness
Title 17B. Limited Purpose Local Government Entities-Local Districts
* ! Chapter 2A. Provisions Applicable to Different Types of Local Districts
*§j Part 4. Improvement District Act
_t> § 17B-2a-406. Improvement districts providing electric service—Public Service Commission
jurisdiction—Exceptions
(l)(a) An improvement district that provides electric service as authorized under Subsection
17B-2a-403(l)(a)(iv):
(i) is a public utility and subject to the jurisdiction of the Public Service Commission;
(ii) may include only an area where:
(A) no retail electricity has been provided to commercial, industrial, residential, and other users of electricity from an investor-owned utility within any part of an area certificated by the Public Service Commission or an area adjacent to that area, municipal agency, or electric cooperative within the five years immediately preceding September 1, 1985; and
(B) electric service is provided to at least one user of electricity within the electric service district as of
September 1, 1985; and
(iii) shall have filed an application for certification and received approval by the Public Service Commission
by September 1, 1986.
(b) Nothing in this part may be construed to give the Public Service Commission jurisdiction over:
(i) an improvement district, other than an improvement district that provides electric service as authorized
under Subsection 17B-2a-403(l)(a)(iv); or
(ii) a municipality or an association of municipalities organized under Title 11, Chapter 13, Interlocal Cooperation Act.
(c) Before an improvement district providing electric service serves any customer, the improvement district
shall obtain a certificate of public convenience and necessity from the Public Service Commission.
(2)(a) Section 54-7-12 does not apply to rate changes of an improvement district that provides electric service as
authorized under Subsection 17B-2a-403(l)(a)(iv) if:
(i) the district is organized for the purpose of distributing electricity to customers within the boundaries of
the district on a not-for-profit basis;
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(ii) the schedule of new rates or other change that results in new rates has been approved by the board of
trustees of the district;
(iii) prior to the implementation of any rate increases, the district first holds a public meeting for all its customers to whom mailed notice of the meeting is sent at least ten days prior to the meeting; and
(iv) the district has filed the schedule of new rates or other change with the Public Service Commission.
(b) The Public Service Commission shall make the district's schedule of new rates or other change available
for public inspection.
CREDIT(S)
Laws 2007, c. 329, § 299, eff. April 30, 2007; Laws 2008, c. 360, § 44, eff. May 5, 2008.
Current through 2008 Second Special Session, including results from the November 2008 General Election.
Copr (c) 2008 Thomson Reuters/West. No claim to orig. U.S. govt.
END OF DOCUMENT
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West's Utah Code Annotated Currentness
Title 54. Public Utilities
* ! Chapter 2. Definitions (Refs & Annos)
-> § 54-2-1. Definitions
As used in this title:
(1) "Avoided costs" means the incremental costs to an electrical corporation of electric energy or capacity or
both which, due to the purchase of electric energy or capacity or both from small power production or cogenei
tion facilities, the electrical corporation would not have to generate itself or purchase from another electrical
corporation.
(2) "Cogeneration facility":
(a) means a facility which produces:
(i) electric energy; and
(ii) steam or forms of useful energy, including heat, which are used for industrial, commercial, heating, oi
cooling purposes; and
(b) is a qualifying cogeneration facility under federal law.
(3) "Commission" means the Public Service Commission of Utah.
(4) "Commissioner" means a member of the commission.
(5)(a) "Corporation" includes an association, and a joint stock company having any powers or privileges not
possessed by individuals or partnerships.
(b) "Corporation" does not include towns, cities, counties, conservancy districts, improvement districts, or
other governmental units created or organized under any general or special law of this state.
(6) "Distribution electrical cooperative" includes an electrical corporation that:
(a) is a cooperative;
(b) conducts a business that includes the retail distribution of electricity the cooperative purchases or generates for the cooperative's members; and
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(c) is required to allocate or distribute savings in excess of additions to reserves and surplus on the basis of
patronage to the cooperative's:
(i) members; or
(ii) patrons.
(7) "Electrical corporation" includes every corporation, cooperative association, and person, their lessees, trustees, and receivers, owning, controlling, operating, or managing any electric plant, or in any way furnishing electric power for public service or to its consumers or members for domestic, commercial, or industrial use, within
this state, except independent energy producers, and except where electricity is generated on or distributed by
the producer solely for the producer's own use, or the use of the producer's tenants, or for the use of members of
an association of unit owners formed under Title 57, Chapter 8, Condominium Ownership Act, and not for sale
to the public generally.
(8) "Electric plant" includes all real estate, fixtures, and personal property owned, controlled, operated, or managed in connection with or to facilitate the production, generation, transmission, delivery, or furnishing of electricity for light, heat, or power, and all conduits, ducts, or other devices, materials, apparatus, or property for
containing, holding, or carrying conductors used or to be used for the transmission of electricity for light, heat,
or power.
(9) "Gas corporation" includes every corporation and person, their lessees, trustees, and receivers, owning, controlling, operating, or managing any gas plant for public service within this state or for the selling or furnishing
of natural gas to any consumer or consumers within the state for domestic, commercial, or industrial use, except
in the situation that:
(a) gas is made or produced on, and distributed by the maker or producer through, private property:
(i) solely for the maker's or producer's own use or the use of the maker's or producer's tenants; and
(ii) not for sale to others;
(b) gas is compressed on private property solely for the owner's own use or the use of the owner's employees
as a motor vehicle fuel; or
(c) gas is compressed by a retailer of motor vehicle fuel on the retailer's property solely for sale as a motor
vehicle fuel.
(10) "Gas plant" includes all real estate, fixtures, and personal property owned, controlled, operated, or managed
in connection with or to facilitate the production, generation, transmission, delivery, or furnishing of gas, natural
or manufactured, for light, heat, or power.
(11) "Heat corporation" includes every corporation and person, their lessees, trustees, and receivers, owning,
controlling, operating, or managing any heating plant for public service within this state.
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(12)(a) "Heating plant" includes all real estate, fixtures, machinery, appliances, and personal property controlled, operated, or managed in connection with or to facilitate the production, generation, transmission, delivery, or furnishing of artificial heat.
(b) "Heating plant" does not include either small power production facilities or cogeneration facilities.
(13) "Independent energy producer" means every electrical corporation, person, corporation, or government entity, their lessees, trustees, or receivers, that own, operate, control, or manage an independent power production
or cogeneration facility.
(14) "Independent power production facility" means a facility that:
(a) produces electric energy solely by the use, as a primary energy source, of biomass, waste, a renewable resource, a geothermal resource, or any combination of the preceding sources; or
(b) is a qualifying power production facility.
(15) "Private telecommunications system" includes all facilities for the transmission of signs, signals, writing,
images, sounds, messages, data, or other information of any nature by wire, radio, lightwaves, or other electromagnetic means, excluding mobile radio facilities, that are owned, controlled, operated, or managed by a corporation or person, including their lessees, trustees, receivers, or trustees appointed by any court, for the use of that
corporation or person and not for the shared use with or resale to any other corporation or person on a regular
basis.
(16)(a) "Public utility" includes every railroad corporation, gas corporation, electrical corporation, distribution
electrical cooperative, wholesale electrical cooperative, telephone corporation, telegraph corporation, water corporation, sewerage corporation, heat corporation, and independent energy producer not described in Subsection
(16)(d), where the service is performed for, or the commodity delivered to, the public generally, or in the case of
a gas corporation or electrical corporation where the gas or electricity is sold or furnished to any member or consumers within the state for domestic, commercial, or industrial use.
(b)(i) If any railroad corporation, gas corporation, electrical corporation, telephone corporation, telegraph corporation, water corporation, sewerage corporation, heat corporation, or independent energy producer not described in Subsection (16)(d), performs a service for or delivers a commodity to the public, it is considered to
be a public utility, subject to the jurisdiction and regulation of the commission and this title.
(ii) If a gas corporation, independent energy producer not described in Subsection (16)(d), or electrical corporation sells or furnishes gas or electricity to any member or consumers within the state, for domestic,
commercial, or industrial use, for which any compensation or payment is received, it is considered to be a
public utility, subject to the jurisdiction and regulation of the commission and this title.
(c) Any corporation or person not engaged in business exclusively as a public utility as defined in this section
is governed by this title in respect only to the public utility owned, controlled, operated, or managed by the
corporation or person, and not in respect to any other business or pursuit.
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(d) An independent energy producer is exempt from the jurisdiction and regulations cf the commission with
respect to an independent power production facility if it meets the requirements of Subsection (16)(d)(i), (ii),
or (iii), or any combination of these:
(i) the commodity or service is produced or delivered, or both, by an independent energy producer solely for
the uses exempted in Subsection (7) or for the use of state-owned facilities;
(ii) the commodity or service is sold by an independent energy producer solely to an electrical corporation
or other wholesale purchaser; or
(iii)(A) the commodity or service delivered by the independent energy producer is delivered to an entity
which controls, is controlled by, or affiliated with the independent energy producer or to a user located on
real property managed by the independent energy producer; and
(B) the real property on which the service or commodity is used is contiguous to real property which is
owned or controlled by the independent energy producer. Parcels of real property separated solely by public roads or easements for public roads shall be considered as contiguous for purposes of this Subsection
(16).
(e) Any person or corporation defined as an electrical corporation or public utility under this section may continue to serve its existing customers subject to any order or future determination of the commission in reference to the right to serve those customers.
(f)(i) "Public utility" does not include any person that is otherwise considered a public utility under this Subsection (16) solely because of that person's ownership of an interest in an electric plant, cogeneration facility,
or small power production facility in this state if all of the following conditions are met:
(A) the ownership interest in the electric plant, cogeneration facility, or small power production facility is
leased to:
(I) a public utility, and that lease has been approved by the commission;
(II) a person or government entity that is exempt from commission regulation as a public utility; or
(III) a combination of Subsections (16)(f)(i)(A)(I) and (II);
(B) the lessor of the ownership interest identified in Subsection (16)(f)(i)(A) is:
(I) primarily engaged in a business other than the business of a public utility; or
(II) a person whose total equity or beneficial ownership is held directly or indirectly by another person
engaged in a business other than the business of a public utility; and
(C) the rent reserved under the lease does not include any amount based on or determined by revenues or
income of the lessee.
(ii) Any person that is exempt from classification as a public utility under Subsection (16)(f)(i) shall continue to be so exempt from classification following termination of the lessee's right to possession or use of the
electric plant for so long as the former lessor does not operate the electric plant or sell electricity from the
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electric plant. If the former lessor operates the electric plant or sells electricity, the former lessor shall continue to be so exempt for a period of 90 days following termination, or for a longer period that is ordered by
the commission. This period may not exceed one year. A change in rates that would otherwise require commission approval may not be effective during the 90-day or extended period without commission approval
(g) "Public utility" does not include any person that provides financing for, but has no ownership interest in an
electric plant, small power production facility, or cogeneration facility. In the event of a foreclosure in which
an ownership interest in an electric plant, small power production facility, or cogeneration facility is transferred to a third-party financer of an electric plant, small power production facility, or cogeneration facility,
then that third-party financer is exempt from classification as a public utility for 90 days following the foreclosure, or for a longer period that is ordered by the commission. This period may not exceed one year.
(h)(i) The distribution or transportation of natural gas for use as a motor vehicle fuel does not cause the distributor or transporter to be a "public utility," unless the commission, after notice and a public hearing, determines by rule that it is in the public interest to regulate the distributers or transporters, but the retail sale
alone of compressed natural gas as a motor vehicle fuel may not cause the seller to be a "public utility."
(ii) In determining whether it is in the public interest to regulate the distributors or transporters, the commission shall consider, among other things, the impact of the regulation on the availability and price of natural
gas for use as a motor fuel.
(17) "Purchasing utility" means any electrical corporation that is required to purchase electricity from small
power production or cogeneration facilities pursuant to the Public Utility Regulatory Policies Act, 16 U.S.C.
Section 824a-3.
(18) "Qualifying power producer" means a corporation, cooperative association, or person, or the lessee, trustee,
and receiver of the corporation, cooperative association, or person, who owns, controls, operates, or manages
any qualifying power production facility or cogeneration facility.
(19) "Qualifying power production facility" means a facility that:
(a) produces electrical energy solely by the use, as a primary energy source, of biomass, waste, a renewable
resource, a geothermal resource, or any combination of the preceding sources;
(b) has a power production capacity that, together with any other facilities located at the same site, is no greater than 80 megawatts; and
(c) is a qualifying small power production facility under federal law.
(20) "Railroad" includes every commercial, interurban, and other railway, other than a street railway, and each
branch or extension of a railway, by any power operated, together with all tracks, bridges, trestles, rightsof-way, subways, tunnels, stations, depots, union depots, yards, grounds, terminals, terminal facilities, structures, and equipment, and all other real estate, fixtures, and personal property of every kind used in connection
with a railway owned, controlled, operated, or managed for public service in the transportation of persons or
property.
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(21) "Railroad corporation" includes every corporation and person, their lessees, trustees, and receivers, owning,
controlling, operating, or managing any railroad for public service within this state.
(22) (a) "Sewerage corporation" includes every corporation and person, their lessees, trustees, and receivers,
owning, controlling, operating, or managing any sewerage system for public service within this state.
(b) "Sewerage corporation" does not include private sewerage companies engaged in disposing of sewage only
for their stockholders, or towns, cities, counties, conservancy districts, improvement districts, or other governmental units created or organized under any general or special law of this state.
(23) "Telegraph corporation" includes every corporation and person, their lessees, trustees, and receivers, owning, controlling, operating, or managing any telegraph line for public service within this state.
(24) "Telegraph line" includes all conduits, ducts, poles, wires, cables, instruments, and appliances, and all other
real estate, fixtures, and personal property owned, controlled, operated, or managed in connection with or to facilitate communication by telegraph, whether that communication be had with or without the use of transmission
wires.
(25)(a) "Telephone corporation" means any corporation or person, and their lessees, trustee, receivers, or trustees appointed by any court, who owns, controls, operates, manages, or resells a public telecommunications service as defined in Section 54-8b-2.
(b) "Telephone corporation" does not mean a corporation, partnership, or firm providing:
(i) intrastate telephone service offered by a provider of cellular, personal communication systems (PCS), or
other commercial mobile radio service as defined in 47 U.S.C. Sec. 332 that has been issued a covering license by the Federal Communications Commission;
(ii) Internet service; or
(iii) resold intrastate toll service.
(26) "Telephone line" includes all conduits, ducts, poles, wires, cables, instruments, and appliances, and all other real estate, fixtures, and personal property owned, controlled, operated, or managed in connection with or to
facilitate communication by telephone whether that communication is had with or without the use of transmission wires.
(27) "Transportation of persons" includes every service in connection with or incidental to the safety, comfort,
or convenience of the person transported, and the receipt, carriage, and delivery of that person and that person's
baggage.
(28) "Transportation of property" includes every service in connection with or incidental to the transportation of
property, including in particular its receipt, delivery, elevation, transfer, switching, carriage, ventilation, refri-
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geration, icing, dunnage, storage, and hauling, and the transmission of credit by express companies.
(29) "Water corporation" includes every corporation and person, their lessees, trustees, and receivers, owning,
controlling, operating, or managing any water system for public service within this state. It does not include
private irrigation companies engaged in distributing water only to their stockholders, or towns, cities, counties,
water conservancy districts, improvement districts, or other governmental units created or organized under any
general or special law of this state.
(30)(a) "Water system" includes all reservoirs, tunnels, shafts, dams, dikes, headgates, pipes, flumes, canals,
structures, and appliances, and all other real estate, fixtures, and personal property owned, controlled, operated,
or managed in connection with or to facilitate the diversion, development, storage, supply, distribution, sale, furnishing, carriage, appointment, apportionment, or measurement of water for power, fire protection, irrigation, reclamation, or manufacturing, or for municipal, domestic, or other beneficial use.
(b) "Water system" does not include private irrigation companies engaged in distributing water only to their
stockholders.
(31) "Wholesale electrical cooperative" includes every electrical corporation that is:
(a) in the business of the wholesale distribution of electricity it has purchased or generated to its members and
the public; and
(b) required to distribute or allocate savings in excess of additions to reserves and surplus to members or patrons on the basis of patronage.
CREDIT(S)
Laws 1917, c. 47, art. 2, § 1; Laws 1925, c. 12, § 1; Laws 1948, 1st Sp.Sess., c. 7, § 1; Laws 1957, c. 106, § 1;
Laws 1959, c. 94, § 1; Laws 1965, c. 106, § 1; Laws 1969, c. 153, § 1; Laws 1984, c. 50, § 1; Laws 1985, c. 97,
§ 1; Laws 1985, c. 98, § 1; Laws 1985, c. 180, § 1; Laws 1985, c. 188, § 1; Laws 1985, c. 253, § 1; Laws 1986,
c. 13; Laws 1986, c. 194, § 8; Laws 1986, c. 215, § 1; Laws 1989, c. 20, § 1; Laws 1992, c. 227, § 1; Laws 1995,
c. 173, § 3, eff. May 1,1995; Laws 1995, c. 316, § 6, eff. March 21, 1995; Laws 1996, c. 170, § 47, eff. July 1,
1996; Laws 2000, c. 55, § 1, eff. May 1, 2000; Laws 2001, c. 212, § 1, eff. April 30, 2001; Laws 2008, c. 374, §
7, eff. Mar. 18,2008.
Codifications C.L. 1917, § 4782; R.S. 1933 § 76-2-1; C. 1943, § 76-2-1.
Current through 2008 Second Special Session, including results from the November 2008 General Election.
Copr (c) 2008 Thomson Reuters/West. No claim to orig. U.S. govt.
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UTAH CODE, 1953
Copyright ® 1953, 1960-1963, 1966, 1968-1971, 1973, 1974, 1976-1978, 1981,
1982, 1984 by The Allen Smith Company; Copyright ® 1986-1988 by The Michie
Company, All rights reserved.
TITLE 54. PUBLIC UTILITIES
CHAPTER 2. DEFINITIONS
54-2-1. Terms defined -- Utilities subject to jurisdiction and regulation.
When used in this title:
(1) "Aerial bucket tramway corporation" includes every corporation and person,
their lessees, trustees, and receivers, owning, controlling, operating, or managing any aerial bucket tramway for public service in this state, except where the
aerial tramway is used only for the purpose of delivering raw material to an industrial or manufacturing plant from its customers.
(2) "Aircraft carrier" includes every corporation and person, their lessees,
trustees, and receivers, operating for public service for hire engaged in intrastate transportation of persons or property. It does not include air carriers
operating with a certificate of convenience and necessity issued by the Federal
Government.
(3) "Automobile corporation" includes every corporation and person, their
lessees, trustees, and receivers, engaged in or transacting the business of transporting passengers or freight, merchandise, or other property for public service
by means of automobiles or motor stages on public streets, roads, or highways
along established routes within this state.
(4) "Avoided costs" means the incremental costs to an electrical corporation
of electric energy or capacity or both which, due to the purchase of electric energy or capacity or both from small power production or cogeneration facilities,
the electrical corporation would not have to generate itself or purchase from another electrical corporation.
(5) "Cogeneration facility":
(a) means a facility which produces:
(i) electric energy; and
(ii) steam or forms of useful energy, such as heat, which are used for indus-
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trial, commercial, heating, or cooling purposes? and
(b) is a qualifying cogeneration facility under federal law.
(6) "Commission" means the Public Service Commission of the state of Utah.
(7) "Commissioner" means a member of the commission.
(8) "Common carrier" includes every:
(a) railroad corporation;
(b) street railroad corporation;
(c) automobile corporation;
(d) scheduled aircraft carrier corporation;
(a) aerial bucket tramway corporation;
(f) express corporation;
(g) dispatch, sleeping, dining, drawing-room, freight, refrigerator, oil,
stock, and fruit car corporation;
(3a) freight line, car-loaning, car-renting, car-loading, and every other car
corporation, and person;
(i) their lessees, trustees, and receivers, operating for public service
within this state; and
(j) every corporation and person, their lessees, trustees, and receivers, engaged in the transportation of persons or property for public service over regular
routes between points within this state.
(9) "Corporation" includes an association, and a joint stock company having
any powers or privileges not possessed by individuals or partnerships. It does not
include towns, cities, counties, conservancy districts, improvement districts, or
other governmental units created or organized under any general or special law of
this state.
(10) "Electrical corporation" includes every corporation, cooperative association, and person, their lessees, trustees, and receivers, owning, controlling,
operating, or managing any electric plant, or in any way furnishing electric power
for public service or to its consumers or members for domestic, commercial, or industrial use, within this state, except independent energy producers, and except
where electricity is generated on or distributed by the producer solely for his
own use, or the use of his tenants, or for the use of members of an association of
unit owners formed under Chapter 8, Title 57, Condominium Ownership Act, and not
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for sale to the public generally.
(11) "Electric plant" includes all real estate, fixtures, and personal property owned, controlled, operated, or managed in connection with or to facilitate
the production, generation, transmission, delivery, or furnishing of electricity
for light, heat, or power, and all conduits, ducts, or other devices, materials,
apparatus, or property for containing, holding, or carrying conductors used or to
be used for the transmission of electricity for light, heat, or power.
(12) "Express corporation" includes every corporation and person, their lessees, trustees, and receivers, engaged in or transacting the business of transporting any freight, merchandise, or other property for public service on the line of
any common carrier or stage or auto line within this state.
(13) "Gas corporation" includes every corporation and person, their lessees,
trustees, and receivers, owning, controlling, operating, or managing any gas plant
for public service within this state or for the selling or furnishing of natural
gas to any consumer or consumers within the state for domestic, commercial, or industrial use, except where gas is made or produced on, and distributed by the
maker or producer through, private property alone, solely for his own use or the
use of his tenants and not for sale to others.
(14) "Gas plant" includes all real estate, fixtures, and personal property
owned, controlled, operated, or managed in connection with or to facilitate the
production, generation, transmission, delivery, or furnishing of gas, natural or
manufactured, for light, heat, or power.
(15) "Heat corporation" includes every corporation and person, their lessees,
trustees, and receivers, owning, controlling, operating, or managing any heating
plant for public service within this state.
(16) "Heating plant" includes all real estate, fixtures, machinery, appliances, and personal property controlled, operated, or managed in connection with
or to facilitate the production, generation, transmission, delivery, or furnishing
of artificial heat. Heating plant does not include either small power production
facilities or cogeneration facilities.
(17) "Independent energy producer" means every electrical corporation, person,
or corporation, their lessees, trustees, or receivers, that own, operate, control,
or manage a small power production or cogeneration facility.
(18) "Person" includes all individuals, government entities, corporations,
partnerships, associations, trusts, and companies and their lessees, trustees, and
receivers.
(19) "Private telecommunications system" includes all facilities for the
transmission of signs, signals, writing, images, sounds, messages, data, or other
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information of any nature by wire, radio, lightwaves, or other electromagnetic
means, excluding mobile radio facilities, that are owned, controlled, operated, or
managed by a corporation or person, including their lessees, trustees, receivers,
or trustees appointed by any court, for the use of that corporation or person and
•not for the shared use with or resale to any other corporation or person on a regular b#sis.
(20) (a) "Public utility" includes every common carrier, gas corporation,
electrical corporation, wholesale electrical cooperative, telephone corporation,
telegraph corporation, water corporation, sewerage corporation, heat corporation,
independent energy producer not described in Subsection (e) , and the warehouseman
where the service is performed for, or the commodity delivered to, the public generally, or in the case of a gas corporation or electrical corporation where the
gas or electricity is sold or furnished to any member or consumers within the
state for domestic, commercial, or industrial use.
(b) (i) If any common carrier, gas corporation, electrical corporation, telephone corporation, telegraph corporation, water corporation, sewerage corporation,
heat corporation, independent energy producer not described in Subsection (e), or
warehouseman performs a service for or delivers a commodity to the public, or (ii)
if a gas corporation, independent energy producer not described in Subsection (e),
or electrical corporation sells or furnishes gas or electricity to any member or
consumers within the state, for domestic, commercial, or industrial use, for which
any compensation or payment is received, that common carrier, gas corporation,
electrical corporation, telephone corporation, telegraph corporation, water corporation, sewerage corporation, heat corporation/ independent energy producer, and
warehouseman is considered to be a public utility/ subject to the jurisdiction and
regulation of the commission and this title.
(c) If any person or corporation performs any such service for or delivers
any such commodity to any public utility as defined in this section, that person
or corporation is considered to be a public utility and is subject to the jurisdiction and regulation of the commission and to this title, except as exempted in
Subsection (e).
(d) Any corporation or person not engaged in business exclusively as a public
utility as defined in this section is governed by this title in respect only to
the public utility owned, controlled, operated, or managed by it or by him, and
not in respect to any other business or pursuit.
(e) An independent energy producer is exempt from the jurisdiction and regulations of the commission if it meets the requirements of (i), (ii), or (iii), or
any combination of these:
(i) the commodity or service is produced or delivered, or both, by an independent energy producer solely for the uses exempted in Subsection (10) or for the
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use of state-owned facilities;
(ii) the commodity or service is sold by an independent energy producer to an
electrical corporation; or
(iii) (A) the commodity or service delivered by the independent energy producer is delivered to an entity which controls, is controlled by, or affiliated with
the independent energy producer or to a user located on real property managed by
the independent energy producer; and
(B) the real property on which the service or commodity is used is contiguous
to real property which is owned or controlled by the independent energy producer.
Parcels of real property separated solely by public roads or easements for public
roads shall be considered as contiguous for purposes of this Subsection
(20) (e) (iii) (B) .
(f) If any person or corporation not engaged in business as a public utility
as defined by this section is able to produce a surplus of electric energy or
power, gas, or water beyond the needs of its own business and desires to sell, exchange, deliver, or otherwise dispose of the surplus to or with any public utility
as defined in this section, the public utility desiring to effect a purchase or
exchange of the surplus shall submit to the commission, for authorization by the
commission, a proposed contract covering the purchase or exchange. The commission
shall then determine, after a public hearing, whether, in the public interest it
is advisable that the contract be executed and, if not adverse to the the public
interest, the commission shall authorize the execution of the contract. The public
utility shall then have the right to purchase and receive or exchange the surplus
product in accordance with the terms of the contract. The person or corporation
selling or exchanging the surplus product under the authorized contract is not
considered a public utility within the meaning of this section, nor is it subject
to the jurisdiction of the commission.
(g) Any person or corporation defined as an electrical corporation or public
utility under this section may continue to serve its existing customers subject to
any order or future determination of the commission in reference to the right to
serve those customers.
(h) (i) "Public utility" does not include any person that is otherwise considered a public utility under the provisions of this Subsection (2 0) solely because of its ownership of an interest in an electric plant, cogeneration facility,
or small power production facility in this state if all of the following conditions are met:
(A) the ownership interest in the electric plant, cogeneration facility, or
small power production facility is leased to:
(I) a public utility, and that lease has been approved by the commission; or
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(II) a person that is exempt from commission regulation as a public utility;
or
(III) a combination of (I) and (II) ;
(B) the lessor of the ownership interest identified in Subsection
(20)(h)(i)(A) is:
(I) primarily engaged in a business other than the business of a public utility? or
(II) a person whose total equity or beneficial ownership is held directly or
indirectly by another person engaged in a business other than the business of a
public utility; and
(C) the rent reserved under the lease does not include any amount based on or
determined by revenues or income of the lessee.
(ii) Any person that is exempt from classification as a public utility under
Subsection (20)(h)(i) shall continue to be so exempt from classification following
termination of the lessee's right to possession or use of the electric plant for
so long as the former lessor does not operate the electric plant or sell electricity from the electric plant. If the former lessor operates the electric plant or
sells electricity, the former lessor shall continue to be so exempt for a period
of 90 days following termination, or for a longer period that is ordered by the
commission. This period may not exceed one year. No change in rates that would
otherwise require commission approval may be effective during the 90-day or extended period without commission approval.
(i) "Public utility" does not include any person that provides financing for,
but has no ownership interest in an electric plant, small power production facility, or cogeneration facility. In the event of a foreclosure in which an ownership
interest in ah electric plant, small power production facility, or cogeneration
facility is transferred to a third-party financer of an electric plant, small
power production facility, or cogeneration facility, then that third-party financer is exempt from classification as a public utility for 90 days following the
foreclosure, or for a longer period that is ordered by the commission. This period
may not exceed one year.
(21) "Purchasing utility" means any electrical corporation that is required to
purchase electricity from small power production or cogeneration facilities pursuant to the Public Utility Regulatory Policies Act, 16 U.S.C. § 824a-3.
(22) "Railroad" includes every commercial, interurban, and other railway, other than a street railway, and each branch or extension of a railway, by any power
operated, together with all tracks, bridges, trestles, rights-of-way, subways,
tunnels, stations, depots, union depots, yards, grounds, terminals, terminal fa-
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cilities, structures, and equipment, and all other real estate, fixtures, and personal property of every kind used in connection with a railway owned, controlled,
operated, or managed for public service in the transportation of persons or property.
(23) "Railroad corporation" includes every corporation and person, their lessees, trustees, and receivers, owning, controlling, operating, or managing any
railroad for public service within this state.
(24) "Sewerage corporation" includes every corporation and person, their lessees, trustees, and receivers, owning, controlling, operating, or managing any sewerage system for public service within this state. It does not include private
sewerage companies engaged in disposing of sewage only for their stockholders, or
towns, cities, counties, conservancy districts, improvement districts, or other
governmental units created or organized under any general or special law of this
state.
(25) "Small power production facility" means a facility which:
(a) produces electric energy solely by the use, as a primary energy source,
of biomass, waste, renewable resources, geothermal resources, or any combination
of them;
(b) has a power production capacity which, together with any other facilities
located at the same site, is not greater than 8 0 megawatts; and
(c) is a qualifying small power production facility under federal law.
(26) "Street railroad" includes every railway, and each branch or extension of
a railway, by any power operated, being mainly upon, along, above, or below any
street, avenue, road, highway, bridge, or public place within any city or town,
together with all real estate, fixtures, and personal property of every kind used
in connection with a railway, owned, controlled, operated, or managed for public
service in the transportation of persons or property. It does not include a railway constituting or used as a part of a commercial or interurban railway.
(27) "Street railroad corporation" includes every corporation and person,
their lessees, trustees, and receivers, owning, controlling, operating, or managing any street railroad for public service within this state.
(28) "Telegraph corporation" includes every corporation and person, their
lessees, trustees, and receivers, owning, controlling, operating, or managing any
telegraph line for public service within this state.
(29) "Telegraph line" includes all conduits, ducts, poles, wires, cables, instruments, and appliances, and all other real estate, fixtures, and personal property owned, controlled, operated, or managed in connection with or to facilitate
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communication by telegraph, whether that communication be had with or without the
use of transmission wires.
(3 0) "Telephone corporation" includes every corporation and person, their
lessees, trustees, and receivers, owning, controlling, operating, or managing any
telephone line for public service within this state, provided, however, that all
corporations, partnerships, or firms providing intrastate cellular telephone service shall cease to be "telephone corporations" nine months after both the wireline and the nonwire-line cellular service providers have been issued covering licenses by the Federal Communications Commission. It does not include any person
which provides, on a resale basis, any telephone or telecommunication service
which is purchased from a telephone corporation.
(31) "Telephone line" includes all conduits, ducts, poles, wires, cables, instruments, and appliances, and all other real estate, fixtures, and personal property owned, controlled, operated, or managed in connection with or to facilitate
communication by telephone whether that communication is had with or without the
use of transmission wires.
(32) "Transportation of persons" includes every service in connection with or
incidental to the safety, comfort, or convenience of the person transported, and
the receipt, carriage, and delivery of that person and his baggage.
(33) "Transportation of property" includes every service in connection with or
incidental to the transportation of property, including in particular its receipt,
delivery, elevation, transfer, switching, carriage, ventilation, refrigeration,
icing, dunnage, storage, and hauling, and the transmission of credit by express
companies.
(34) "Warehouseman" includes every corporation and person, their lessees,
trustees, and receivers, owning, controlling, operating, or managing any grain elevator or any building or structure in which property is regularly stored for public use within this state, in connection with or to facilitate the transportation
of property by a common carrier or the loading or unloading of that property.
(35) "Water corporation" includes every corporation and person, their lessees,
trustees, and receivers, owning, controlling, operating, or managing any water
system for public service within this state. It does not include private irrigation companies engaged in distributing water only to their stockholders, or towns,
cities, counties, water conservancy districts, improvement districts, or other
governmental units created or organized under any general or special law of this
state.
(36) "Water system" includes all reservoirs, tunnels, shafts, dams, dikes,
headgates, pipes, flumes, canals, structures, and appliances, and all other real
estate, fixtures, and personal property owned, controlled, operated, or managed in
connection with or to facilitate the diversion, development, storage, supply, dis-
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tribution, sale, furnishing, carriage, appointment, apportionment, or measurement
of water for power, fire protection, irrigation, reclamation, or manufacturing, or
for municipal, domestic, or other beneficial use. It does not include private irrigation companies engaged in distributing water only to their stockholders.
(37) "Wholesale electrical cooperative" includes every electrical corporation:
(a) which is in the business of the wholesale distribution of electricity it
has purchased or generated to its members and the public; and
(b) which is required to distribute or allocate savings in excess of additions to reserves and surplus to members or patrons on the basis of patronage.
History: L. 1917, ch. 47, art. 2, § 1; C.L. 1917, § 4782; L. 1925, ch. 12, § 1;
R.S. 1933 & C. 1943, 76-2-1; L. 1948 (1st S.S.), ch. 7, § 1; 1957, ch. 106, § 1;
1959, ch. 94, § 1; 1965, ch. 106, § 1; 1969, ch. 153, § 1; 1984, ch. 50, § 1;
1985, ch. 97, § 1; 1985, ch. 98, § 1; 1985, ch. 180, § 1; 1985, ch. 188, § 1;
1985, Ch. 253, § 1; L. 1986, ch. 13; 1986, ch. 194, § 8; 1986, ch. 215, § 1.
NOTES, REFERENCES, AND ANNOTATIONS
Amendment Notes.

-- The 1985 amendments rewrote this section.

The 1986 amendment by Laws 19 86, ch. 13 added the second sentence in Subsection
(14), substituted "for the use of members of an association" for "by an association" and "the public generally" for "others" in Subsection (19), inserted "electrical corporation" in Subsection (33), rewrote Subsection (35)(e), added Subsections (35)(h) and (i) and made various stylistic changes throughout the section.
The 1986 amendment by Laws 1986, ch. 194 arranged the subsections in alphabetical order; in Subsection (2 0) (c) made minor word changes; and in Subsection (2 0) (e)
substituted " ( 5 ) , (10), (17), (20), and (25)" for "54-2- 1(19), (31), (32), (33),
and (35)".
The 1986 amendment by Laws 1986, ch. 215 substituted "any person which provides,
on a resale basis" for "hospitals, hotels, motels, or inns, which provide on a
sale or resale basis" and "which is purchased from a telephone company" for "to
their registered patrons" in the second sentence of Subsection (22).
This section is set out as reconciled by the Office of Legislative Research and
General Counsel.
Cross-References. -- Cities, construction and operation of utilities, § 10-814.
Common carriers or telephone or telegraph corporations, sales tax, § 59-15-4.
Consolidation of competing railroads prohibited, Utah Const., Art. XII, Sec. 13.
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West's Utah Code Annotated Currentness
Title 54. Public Utilities
* ! Chapter 2. Definitions (Refs & Annos)
-• § 54-2-2. Definition of "person"
As used in this chapter, "person" includes all individuals, corporations, partnerships, associations, trusts, and
companies and their lessees, trustees, and receivers.
CREDIT(S)
Laws 1989, c. 20, § 2.
Current through 2008 Second Special Session, including results from the November 2008 General Election.
Copr (c) 2008 Thomson ReutersAVest. No claim to orig. U.S. govt.
END OF DOCUMENT
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c
West's Utah Code Annotated Currentness
Title 54. Public Utilities
*S Chapter 3. Duties of Public Utilities
-• § 54-3-2. Schedules of rates and classification—Right of inspection—Changes by commission
(1) Under the rules and regulations made by the commission, every public utility, shall file with the commission
within the time and in the form as the commission may designate, and shall print and keep open to public inspection, schedules showing all rates, tolls, rentals, charges, and classifications collected or enforced, or to be
collected or enforced, together with all rules, regulations, contracts, privileges, and facilities which in any manner affect or relate to rates, tolls, rentals, charges, classifications, or service.
(2) Except for motor carriers exempted under federal law, nothing in this section shall prevent the commission
from approving or fixing rates, tolls, rentals, or charges from time to time greater, or less, than those shown by
the schedules.
(3) The commission shall have power, in its discretion, to determine and prescribe, by order, changes in the form
of the schedules referred to in this section as it may find expedient, and to modify the requirements of any of its
orders or rules or regulations in respect to any matters described in this section.
CREDIT(S)
Laws 1917, c. 47, art. 3, § 1; Laws 1995, c. 316, § 7, eff. March 21, 1995; Laws 1996, c. 170, § 48, eff. July 1,
1996.
Codifications C.L. 1917, § 4784; R.S. 1933, § 76-3-2; C. 1943, § 76-3-2.
Current through 2008 Second Special Session, including results from the November 2008 General Election.
Copr (c) 2008 Thomson Reuters/West. No claim to orig. U.S. govt.
END OF DOCUMENT
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c
West's Utah Code Annotated Currentness
Title 54. Public Utilities
* i Chapter 3. Duties of Public Utilities
-f § 54-3-23. Commission's orders must be obeyed
Every public utility shall obey and comply with each and every requirement of every order, decision, direction,
rule or regulation made or prescribed by the commission in the matters herein specified, or in any other matter in
any way relating to or affecting its business as a public utility, and shall do everything necessary or proper in order to secure compliance with and observance of every such order, decision, direction, rule or regulation by all
of its officers, agents and employees.
CREDIT(S)
Laws 1917, c. 47, art. 3, § 15.
Codifications C.L. 1917, § 4797; R.S. 1933, § 76-3-23; C. 1943, § 76-3-23.
Current through 2008 Second Special Session, including results from the November 2008 General Election.
Copr (c) 2008 Thomson Reuters/West. No claim to orig. U.S. govt.
END OF DOCUMENT
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c
West's Utah Code Annotated Currentness
Title 54. Public Utilities
* ! Chapter 4. Authority of Commission Over Public Utilities
-• § 54-4-1. General jurisdiction
The commission is hereby vested with power and jurisdiction to supervise and regulate every public utility in
this state, and to supervise all of the business of every such public utility in this state, and to do all things,
whether herein specifically designated or in addition thereto, which are necessary or convenient in the exercise
of such power and jurisdiction; provided, however, that the Department of Transportation shall have jurisdiction
over those safety functions transferred to it by the Department of Transportation Act. [FN1]
CREDIT(S)
Laws 1917, c. 47, art. 4, § 1; Laws 1975, 1st Sp.Sess., c. 9, § 15.
Codifications C.L. 1917, § 4798; R.S. 1933, § 76-4-1; C. 1943, § 76-4-1.
[FN1] Section 72-1-101 et seq.
Current through 2008 Second Special Session, including results from the November 2008 General Election.
Copr (c) 2008 Thomson Reuters/West. No claim to orig. U.S. govt.
END OF DOCUMENT
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Title 54. Public Utilities
* ! Chapter 4. Authority of Commission Over Public Utilities
-* § 54-4-4. Classification and fixing of rates after hearing
(l)(a) The commission shall take an action described in Subsection (1)0), if the commission finds after a hearing that:
(i) the rates, fares, tolls, rentals, charges, or classifications demanded, observed, charged, or collected by
any public utility for, or in connection with, any service, product, or commodity, including the rates or fares
for excursion or commutation tickets, or that the rules, regulations, practices, or contracts affecting the rates,
fares, tolls, rentals, charges, or classifications are:
(A) unjust;
(B) unreasonable;
(C) discriminatory;
(D) preferential; or
(E) otherwise in violation of any provisions of law; or
(ii) the rates, fares, tolls, rentals, charges, or classifications described in Subsection (l)(a)(i) are insufficient.
(b) If the commission makes a finding described in Subsection (l)(a), the commission shall:
(i) determine the just, reasonable, or sufficient rates, fares, tolls, rentals, charges, classifications, rules, regulations, practices, or contracts to be thereafter observed and in force; and
(ii) fix the determination described in Subsection (1)0)® by order as provided in this section.
(2) The commission may:
(a) investigate:
(i) one or more rates, fares, tolls, rentals, charges, classifications, rules, regulations, contracts, or practices
of any public utility; or
(ii) one or more schedules of rates, fares, tolls, rentals, charges, classifications, rules, regulations, contracts,
or practices of any public utility; and
(b) establish, after hearing, new rates, fares, tolls, rentals, charges, classifications, rules, regulations, contracts,
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practices, or schedules in lieu of them.
(3)(a) If in the commission's determination of just and reasonable rates the commission uses a test period, the
commission shall select a test period that, on the basis of evidence, the commission finds best reflects the conditions that a public utility will encounter during the period when the rates determined by the commission will be
in effect.
(b) In establishing the test period determined in Subsection (3)(a), the commission may use:
(i) a future test period that is determined on the basis of projected data not exceeding 20 months from the
date a proposed rate increase or decrease is filed with the commission under Section 54-7-12;
(ii) a test period that is:
(A) determined on the basis of historic data; and
(B) adjusted for known and measurable changes; or
(iii) a test period that is determined on the basis of a combination of:
(A) future projections; and
(B) historic data.
(c) If pursuant to this Subsection (3), the commission establishes a test period that is not determined exclusively on the basis of future projections, in determining just and reasonable rates the commission shall consider
changes outside the test period that:
(i) occur during a time period that is close in time to the test period;
(ii) are known in nature; and
(iii) are measurable in amount.
(4)(a) If, in the commission's determination of just, reasonable, or sufficient rates, the commission considers the
prudence of an action taken by a public utility or an expense incurred by a public utility, the commission shall
apply the following standards in making its prudence determination:
(i) ensure just and reasonable rates for the retail ratepayers of the public utility in this state;
(ii) focus on the reasonableness of the expense resulting from the action of the public utility judged as of the
time the action was taken;
(iii) determine whether a reasonable utility, knowing what the utility knew or reasonably should have
known at the time of the action, would reasonably have incurred all or some portion of the expense, in taking the same or some other prudent action; and
(iv) apply other factors determined by the commission to be relevant, consistent with the standards specified
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in this section.
(b) The commission may find an expense fully or partially prudent, up to the level that a reasonable utility
would reasonably have incurred.
CREDIT(S)
Laws 1917, c. 47, art. 4, § 3; Laws 1975, c. 166, § 1; Laws 2003, c. 200, § 1, eff. May 5, 2003; Laws 2005, c.
11, § 1, eff. Feb. 25,2005.
Codifications C.L. 1917, § 4800; R.S. 1933, § 76-4-4; C. 1943, § 76-4-4.
Current through 2008 Second Special Session, including results from the November 2008 General Election.
Copr (c) 2008 Thomson Reuters/West. No claim to orig. U.S. govt.
END OF DOCUMENT
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West's Utah Code Annotated Currentness
Title 54. Public Utilities
* ! Chapter 4. Authority of Commission Over Public Utilities
«t § 54-4-7. Rules, equipment, service—Regulation after hearing
Whenever the commission shall find, after a hearing, that the rules, regulations, practices, equipment, appliances, facilities, or service of any public utility, or the methods of manufacture, distribution, transmission, storage or supply employed by it, are unjust, unreasonable, unsafe, improper, inadequate or insufficient, the commission shall determine the just, reasonable, safe, proper, adequate or sufficient rules, regulations, practices,
equipment, appliances, facilities, service or methods to be observed, furnished, constructed, enforced or employed, and shall fix the same by its order, rule or regulation. The commission, after a hearing, shall prescribe
rules and regulations for the performance of any service or the furnishing of any commodity of the character furnished or supplied by any public utility, and on proper demand and tender of rates such public utility shall furnish such commodity or render such service within the time and upon the conditions provided in such rules.
CREDIT(S)
Laws 1917, c. 47, art. 4, § 6.
Codifications C.L. 1917, § 4803; R.S. 1933, § 76-4-7; C. 1943, § 76-4-7.
Current through 2008 Second Special Session, including results from the November 2008 General Election.
Copr (c) 2008 Thomson Reuters/West. No claim to orig. U.S. govt.
END OF DOCUMENT
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c
West's Utah Code Annotated Currentness
Title 54. Public Utilities
* i Chapter 4. Authority of Commission Over Public Utilities
.+ § 54-4-18. Electric, gas, and water service
The commission shall have power, after a hearing, to ascertain and fix just and reasonable standards, classifications, regulations, practices, measurements or service to be furnished, imposed, observed and followed by all
electrical, gas and water corporations; to ascertain and fix adequate and serviceable standards for the measurement of quantity, quality, pressure, initial voltage or other conditions pertaining to the supply of the product,
commodity or service furnished or rendered by any such public utility; to prescribe reasonable regulations for
the examination and testing of such products, commodity or service, and for the measurement thereof; to establish reasonable rules, regulations, specifications and standards to secure the accuracy of all meters and appliances for measurements; and to provide for the examination and testing of any and all appliances used for the
measurement of any product, commodity or service of any such public utility.
CREDIT(S)
Laws 1917, c. 47, art. 4, § 17.
Codifications C.L. 1917, § 4814; R.S. 1933, § 76-4-18; C. 1943, § 76-4-18.
Current through 2008 Second Special Session, including results from the November 2008 General Election.
Copr (c) 2008 Thomson Reuters/West. No claim to orig. U.S. govt.
END OF DOCUMENT
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West's Utah Code Annotated Currentness
Title 54. Public Utilities
*y Chapter 4. Authority of Commission Over Public Utilities
-+ § 54-4-21. Valuation of public utilities
The commission shall have power to ascertain the value of the property of every public utility in this state and
every fact which in its judgment may or does have any bearing on such value. The commission shall have power
to make revaluations from time to time and to ascertain the value of new construction, extensions, and additions
to the property of every public utility; provided, that the valuation of the property of all public utilities doing
business within this state located in Utah as recorded in accordance with section 54-4-22 of this chapter shall be
considered the actual value of the properties of said public utilities in Utah unless otherwise changed after hearings by order of the commission. In case the commission changes the valuation of the properties of any public
utility said new valuations found by the commission shall be the valuations of said public utility for all purposes
provided in this chapter.
CREDIT(S)
Laws 1917, c. 47, art. 4, § 18; Laws 1937, c. 87, § 1.
Codifications C.L. 1917, § 4815; R.S. 1933, § 76-4-21; C. 1943, § 76-4-21.
Current through 2008 Second Special Session, including results from the November 2008 General Election.
Copr (c) 2008 Thomson Reuters/West. No claim to orig. U.S. govt.
END OF DOCUMENT
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c
West's Utah Code Annotated Currentness
Title 54. Public Utilities
* ! Chapter 4. Authority of Commission Over Public Utilities
-f § 54-4-23. Accounts and records of utilities
The commission shall have power to establish a system of accounts to be kept by public utilities subject to its
jurisdiction, to classify said public utilities and to establish a system of accounts for each class and to prescribe
the manner in which such accounts shall be kept. It may also, in its discretion prescribe the forms of accounts,
records and memoranda to be kept by such public utilities, including accounts, records and memoranda of the
movement of traffic as well as of the receipts and expenditures of moneys, and any other forms, records and
memoranda which in the judgment of the commission may be necessary to carry out any of the provisions of this
title. The system of accounts established by the commission and the forms of accounts, records and memoranda
prescribed by it shall not be inconsistent, in the case of corporations subject to the provisions of the Act of Congress entitled, "An Act to Regulate Commerce," approved February 4, 1887, and the acts amendatory thereof
and supplementary thereto, [FN1] with the system and forms from time to time established for such corporations
by the interstate commerce commission; but nothing herein contained shall affect the power of the commission
to prescribe forms of accounts, records and memoranda covering information in addition to that required by the
interstate commerce commission. The commission may, after hearing had upon its own motion or upon complaint, prescribe by order the accounts in which particular outlays and receipts shall be entered, charged or credited. When the commission shall have prescribed the forms of accounts, records or memoranda to be kept by any
public utility corporation for any of its business it shall thereafter be unlawful for such public utility to keep any
accounts, records or memoranda for such business other than those so prescribed or those prescribed by or under
the authority of any other state or of the United States, excepting such accounts, records or other memoranda as
shall be explanatory of and supplemental to the accounts, records or memoranda prescribed by the commission.
CREDIT(S)
Laws 1917, c. 47, art. 4, § 19.
Codifications C.L. 1917, § 4816; R.S. 1933, § 76-4-22; C. 1943, § 76-4-22.
[FN1] See the Interstate Commerce Act, 49 U.S.C.A. § 10101 et seq.
Current through 2008 Second Special Session, including results from the November 2008 General Election.
Copr (c) 2008 Thomson Reuters/West. No claim to orig. U.S. govt.
END OF DOCUMENT
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West's Utah Code Annotated Currentness
Title 54. Public Utilities
^H Chapter 4. Authority of Commission Over Public Utilities
_>. § 54-4-26. Contracts calling for expenditures—Commission to approve
Every public utility when ordered by the commission shall, before entering into any contract for construction
work or for the purchase of new facilities or with respect to any other expenditures, submit such proposed contract, purchase or other expenditure to the commission for its approval; and, if the commission finds that any
such proposed contract, purchase or other expenditure diverts, directly or indirectly, the funds of such public
utility to any of its officers or stockholders or to any corporation in which they are interested, or is not proposed
in good faith for the economic benefit of such public utility, the commission shall withliold its approval of such
contract, purchase or other expenditure, and may order other contracts, purchases or expenditures in lieu thereof
for the legitimate purposes and economic welfare of such public utility.
CREDIT(S)
Laws 1917, c. 47, art. 4, §22.
Codifications C.L. 1917, § 4819; R.S. 1933, § 76-4-28; C. 1943, § 76-4-28.
Current through 2008 Second Special Session, including results from the November 2008 General Election.
Copr (c) 2008 Thomson Reuters/West. No claim to orig. U.S. govt.
END OF DOCUMENT
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c
West's Utah Code Annotated Currentness
Title 54. Public Utilities
* ! Chapter 4. Authority of Commission Over Public Utilities
-f § 54-4-31. Electrical corporation to issue securities only on consent of commission-Exceptions—Validity of securities
(1) Except as provided by Subsection (2) or (4), without prior written approval of the commission, no electrical
corporation may:
(a) issue any security; or
(b) assume any obligation or liability as guarantor, endorser, surety, or otherwise, for any security of another
person relating to the financing of pollution control revenue bonds.
(2)(a) Authorization of the commission is not required for the issuance or renewal of, or assumption of liability
on, a note or draft if:
(i) the maturity date of the note or draft is not more than one year after the date of the issue, renewal, or assumption of liability; and
(ii) the aggregate value of the note or draft together with all other outstanding notes and drafts of a maturity
of one year or less on which the public utility is primarily or secondarily liable is not more than 5% of the
par value of the other outstanding securities of the public utility.
(b) In the case of securities having no par value, the par value for the purpose of this section is the fair market
value as of the date of issue.
(3) Any securities issued pursuant to an order entered by authority of this section shall be valid notwithstanding
the outcome of any further proceedings, unless:
(a) application for stay is'filed with a court of competent jurisdiction within five days following the issuance
of the order; and
(b) a stay is entered by the commission or a court of competent jurisdiction within ten days after the order is
issued.
(4) The commission may by rule, or by order pursuant to standards promulgated by rule, exempt any security,
class of securities, electrical corporation, or class of electrical corporation from the requirement of Subsection
(1), subject to any terms and conditions prescribed in the order or rule, if it finds that the application of Subsection (1) to the security, class of securities, electrical corporation, or class of electrical corporation is not required
by the public interest.
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CREDIT(S)
Laws 1977, c. 205, § 1; Laws 1987, c. 161, § 152; Laws 1997, c. 206, § 1, eff. May 5, 1997.
Current through 2008 Second Special Session, including results from the November 2008 General Election.
Copr (c) 2008 Thomson ReutersAVest. No claim to orig. U.S. govt.
END OF DOCUMENT
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West's Utah Code Annotated Currentness
Title 54, Public Utilities
* ! Chapter 7. Hearings, Practice, and Procedure
-f § 54-7-10. Orders on hearings—Time effective
(1) Orders of the commission shall take effect and become operative on the date issued, except as otherwise
provided in the order.
(2) They shall continue in force for the period designated in the order, or until changed or abrogated by the commission.
CREDIT(S)
Laws 1917, c. 47, art. 5, § 9; Laws 1981, c. 1, § 5; Laws 1981, c. 215, § 3; Laws 1987, c. 161, § 163.
Codifications C.L. 1917, § 4828; R.S. 1933, § 76-6-10; C. 1943, § 76-6-10.
Current through 2008 Second Special Session, including results from the November 2008 General Election.
Copr (c) 2008 Thomson Reuters/West No claim to orig. U.S. govt.
END OF DOCUMENT
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West's Utah Code Annotated Currentness
Title 78A. Judiciary and Judicial Administration (Refs & Annos)
*§ Chapter 3. Supreme Court
-+ § 78A-3-102. Supreme Court jurisdiction
(1) The Supreme Court has original jurisdiction to answer questions of state law certified by a court of the
United States.
(2) The Supreme Court has original jurisdiction to issue all extraordinary writs and authority to issue all writs
and process necessary to carry into effect its orders, judgments, and decrees or in aid of its jurisdiction.
(3) The Supreme Court has appellate jurisdiction, including jurisdiction of interlocutory appeals, over:
(a) a judgment of the Court of Appeals;
(b) cases certified to the Supreme Court by the Court of Appeals prior to final judgment by the Court of Appeals;
(c) discipline of lawyers;
(d) final orders of the Judicial Conduct Commission;
(e) final orders and decrees in formal adjudicative proceedings originating with:
(i) the Public Service Commission;
(ii) the State Tax Commission;
(iii) the School and Institutional Trust Lands Board of Trustees;
(iv) the Board of Oil, Gas, and Mining;
(v) the state engineer; or
(vi) the executive director of the Department of Natural Resources reviewing actions of the Division of
Forestry, Fire and State Lands;
(f) final orders and decrees of the district court review of informal adjudicative proceedings of agencies under
Subsection (3)(e);
(g) a final judgment or decree of any court of record holding a statute of the United States or this state unconstitutional on its face under the Constitution of the United States or the Utah Constitution;
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(h) interlocutory appeals from any court of record involving a charge of a first degree or capital felony;
(i) appeals from the district court involving a conviction or charge of a first degree felony or capital felony;
(j) orders, judgments, and decrees of any court of record over which the Court of Appeals does not have original appellate jurisdiction; and
(k) appeals from the district court of orders, judgments, or decrees ruling on legislative subpoenas.
(4) The Supreme Court may transfer to the Court of Appeals any of the matters over which the Supreme Court
has original appellate jurisdiction, except:
(a) capital felony convictions or an appeal of an interlocutory order of a court of record involving a charge of
a capital felony;
(b) election and voting contests;
(c) reapportionment of election districts;
(d) retention or removal of public officers;
(e) matters involving legislative subpoenas; and
(f) those matters described in Subsections (3)(a) through (d).
(5) The Supreme Court has sole discretion in granting or denying a petition for writ of certiorari for the review
of a Court of Appeals adjudication, but the Supreme Court shall review those cases certified to it by the Court of
Appeals under Subsection (3)(b).
(6) The Supreme Court shall comply with the requirements of Title 63G, Chapter 4, Administrative Procedures
Act, in its review of agency adjudicative proceedings.
CREDIT(S)
Laws 2008, c. 3, § 344, eff. Feb. 7, 2008; Laws 2008, c. 382, § 2209, eff. May 5, 2008.
Current through 2008 Second Special Session, including results from the November 2008 General Election.
Copr (c) 2008 Thomson Reuters/West. No claim to orig. U.S. govt.
END OF DOCUMENT
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c
West's Utah Code Annotated Currentness
State Court Rules
*1 Utah Rules of Civil Procedure (Refs & Annos)
*y Part VIII. Provisional and Final Remedies and Special Proceedings
-• RULE 65B. EXTRAORDINARY RELIEF
(a) Availability of Remedy. Where no other plain, speedy and adequate remedy is available, a person may petition the court for extraordinary relief on any of the grounds set forth in paragraph (b) (involving wrongful restraint on personal liberty), paragraph (c) (involving the wrongful use of public or corporate authority) or paragraph (d) (involving the wrongful use of judicial authority, the failure to exercise such authority, and actions by
the Board of Pardons and Parole). There shall be no special form of writ. Except for instances governed by Rule
65C, the procedures in this rule shall govern proceedings on all petitions for extraordinary relief. To the extent
that this rule does not provide special procedures, proceedings on petitions for extraordinary relief shall be governed by the procedures set forth elsewhere in these rules.
(b) Wrongful Restraints on Personal Liberty.
(1) Scope. Except for instances governed by Rule 65C, this paragraph shall govern all petitions claiming that a
person has been wrongfully restrained of personal liberty, and the court may grant relief appropriate under this
paragraph.
(2) Commencement. The proceeding shall be commenced by filing a petition with the clerk of the court in the
district in which the petitioner is restrained or the respondent resides or in which the alleged restraint is occurring.
(3) Contents of the Petition and Attachments. The petition shall contain a short, plain statement of the facts on
the basis of which the petitioner seeks relief. It shall identify the respondent and the place where the person is
restrained. It shall state the cause or pretense of the restraint, if known by the petitioner. It shall state whether
the legality of the restraint has already been adjudicated in a prior proceeding and, if so, the reasons for the denial of relief in the prior proceeding. The petitioner shall attach to the petition any legal process available to the
petitioner that resulted in restraint. The petitioner shall also attach to the petition a copy of the pleadings filed by
the petitioner in any prior proceeding that adjudicated the legality of the restraint.
(4) Memorandum of Authorities. The petitioner shall not set forth argument or citations or discuss authorities in
the petition, but these may be set out in a separate memorandum, two copies of which shall be filed with the petition.
(5) Dismissal of Frivolous Claims. On review of the petition, if it is apparent to the court that the legality of the

© 2009 Thomson Reuters/West. No Claim to Orig. US Gov. Works.

Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, Rule 65B

Page 2

restraint has already been adjudicated in a prior proceeding, or if for any other reason any claim in the petition
shall appear frivolous on its face, the court shall forthwith issue an order dismissing the claim, stating that the
claim is frivolous on its face and the reasons for this conclusion. The order need not state findings of fact or conclusions of law. The order shall be sent by mail to the petitioner. Proceedings on the claim shall terminate with
the entry of the order of dismissal
(6) Responsive Pleadings. If the petition is not dismissed as being frivolous on its face, the court shall direct the
clerk of the court to serve a copy of the petition and a copy of any memorandum upon the respondent by mail.
At the same time, the court may issue an order directing the respondent to answer or otherwise respond to the
petition, specifying a time within which the respondent must comply. If the circumstances require, the court may
also issue an order directing the respondent to appear before the court for a hearing on the legality of the restraint. An answer to a petition shall state plainly whether the respondent has restrained the person alleged to
have been restrained, whether the person so restrained has been transferred to any other person, and if so, the
identity of the transferee, the date of the transfer, and the reason or authority for the transfer. Nothing in this
paragraph shall be construed to prohibit the court from ruling upon the petition based upon a dispositive motion.
(7) Temporary Relief. If it appears that the person alleged to be restrained will be removed from the court's jurisdiction or will suffer irreparable injury before compliance with the hearing order can be enforced, the court shall
issue a warrant directing the sheriff to bring the respondent before the court to be dealt with according to law.
Pending a determination of the petition, the court may place the person alleged to have been restrained in the
custody of such other persons as may be appropriate.
(8) Alternative Service of the Hearing Order. If the respondent cannot be found, or if it appears that a person
other than the respondent has custody of the person alleged to be restrained, the hearing order and any other process issued by the court may be served on the person having custody in the manner and with the same effect as if
that person had been named as respondent in the action.
(9) Avoidance of Service by Respondent. If anyone having custody of the person alleged to be restrained avoids
service of the hearing order or attempts wrongfully to remove the person from the court's jurisdiction, the sheriff
shall immediately arrest the responsible person. The sheriff shall forthwith bring the person arrested before the
court to be dealt with according to law.
(10) Hearing or Other Proceedings. In the event that the court orders a hearing, the court shall hear the matter in
a summary fashion and shall render judgment accordingly. The respondent or other person having custody shall
appear with the person alleged to be restrained or shall state the reasons for failing to do so. The court may nevertheless direct the respondent to bring before it the person alleged to be restrained. If the petitioner waives the
right to be present at the hearing, the court shall modify the hearing order accordingly. The hearing order shall
not be disobeyed for any defect of form or any misdescription in the order or the petition, if enough is stated to
impart the meaning and intent of the proceeding to the respondent.
(c) Wrongful Use of or Failure to Exercise Public Authority.
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(1) Who May Petition the Court; Security. The attorney general may, and when directed to do so by the governor
shall, petition the court for relief on the grounds enumerated in this paragraph. Any person who is not required
to be represented by the attorney general and who is aggrieved or threatened by one of the acts enumerated in
subparagraph (2) of this paragraph may petition the court under this paragraph if (A) the person claims to be entitled to an office unlawfully held by another or (B) if the attorney general fails to file a petition under this paragraph after receiving notice of the person's claim. A petition filed by a person other than the attorney general under this paragraph shall be brought in the name of the petitioner, and the petition shall be accompanied by an undertaking with sufficient sureties to pay any judgment for costs and damages that may be recovered against the
petitioner in the proceeding. The sureties shall be in the form for bonds on appeal provided for in Rule 73.
(2) Grounds for Relief. Appropriate relief may be granted: (A) where a person usurps, intrudes into, or unlawfully holds or exercises a public office, whether civil or military, a franchise, or an office in a corporation created by the authority of the state of Utah; (B) where a public officer does or permits any act that results in a forfeiture of the office; (C) where persons act as a corporation in the state of Utah without being legally incorporated; (D) where any corporation has violated the laws of the state of Utah relating to the creation, alteration or
renewal of corporations; or (E) where any corporation has forfeited or misused its corporate rights, privileges or
franchises.
(3) Proceedings on the Petition. On the filing of a petition, the court may require that notice be given to adverse
parties before issuing a hearing order, or may issue a hearing order requiring the adverse party to appear at the
hearing on the merits. The court may also grant temporary relief in accordance with the terms of Rule 65 A.
(d) Wrongful Use of Judicial Authority or Failure to Comply With Duty; Actions by Board of Pardons
and Parole.
(1) Who May Petition. A person aggrieved or whose interests are threatened by any of the acts enumerated in
this paragraph may petition the court for relief.
(2) Grounds for Relief Appropriate relief may be granted: (A) where an inferior court, administrative agency, or
officer exercising judicial functions has exceeded its jurisdiction or abused its discretion; (B) where an inferior
court, administrative agency, corporation or person has failed to perform an act required by law as a duty of office, trust or station; (C) where an inferior court, administrative agency, corporation or person has refused the
petitioner the use or enjoyment of a right or office to which the petitioner is entitled; or (D) where the Board of
Pardons and Parole has exceeded its jurisdiction or failed to perform an act required by constitutional or statutory law.
(3) Proceedings on the Petition. On the filing of a petition, the court may require that notice be given to adverse
parties before issuing a hearing order, or may issue a hearing order requiring the adverse party to appear at the
hearing on the merits. The court may direct the inferior court, administrative agency, officer, corporation or other person named as respondent to deliver to the court a transcript or other record of the proceedings. The court
may also grant temporary relief in accordance with the terms of Rule 65 A.
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(4) Scope of Review. Where the challenged proceedings are judicial in nature, the court's review shall not extend
further than to determine whether the respondent has regularly pursued its authority.
CREDIT(S)
[Amended effective September 1, 1991; May 1,1993; July 1, 1996.]
Current with amendments effective April 1,2009.
Copr (c) 2008 Thomson Reuters/West. No claim to orig. U.S. govt.
END OF DOCUMENT
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c
West's Utah Code Annotated Currentness
State Court Rules
*! Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure (Refs & Annos)
* ! Title VII. Jurisdiction on Writ of Certiorari to Court of Appeals
.+ RULE 46. CONSIDERATIONS GOVERNING REVIEW OF CERTIORARI
(a) Review by a writ of certiorari is not a matter of right, but of judicial discretion, and will be granted only for
special and important reasons. The following, while neither controlling nor wholly measuring the Supreme
Court's discretion, indicate the character of reasons that will be considered:
(1) When a panel of the Court of Appeals has rendered a decision in conflict with a decision of another panel of
the Court of Appeals on the same issue of law;
(2) When a panel of the Court of Appeals has decided a question of state or federal law in a way that is in conflict with a decision of the Supreme Court;
(3) When a panel of the Court of Appeals has rendered a decision that has so far departed from the accepted and
usual course of judicial proceedings or has so far sanctioned such a departure by a lower court as to call for an
exercise of the Supreme Court's power of supervision; or
(4) When the Court of Appeals has decided an important question of municipal, state, or federal law which has
not been, but should be, settled by the Supreme Court.
(b) After a petition for certiorari has been filed, the panel that issued the opinion of the Court of Appeals may issue a minute entry recommending that the Supreme Court grant the petition. Parties shall not request such a recommendation by motion or otherwise.
CREDIT(S)
[Amended effective October 1, 1992; M y 1, 1994.]
Current with amendments effective April 1, 2009.
Copr (c) 2008 Thomson Reuters/West. No claim to orig. U.S. govt.
END OF DOCUMENT
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ADDENDUM B
IMPORTANT PARTS OF THE RECORD

- BEFORE THE PUBLIC SERVICE COMMISSION OF UTAH )

In the Matter of the Complaint of Rocky
Mountain Power, a division of PacifiCorp,
against Heber Light & Power Regarding
Unauthorized Service by Heber Light & Power
in Areas Certificated to Rocky Mountain
Power

)
)
)
)
)
)

DOCKET NO. 07-035-22

REPORT AND ORDER

)

ISSUED: November 3. 2008
By The Commission:
THIS MATTER is before the Public Service Commission (Commission) on
Heber Light and Power's (HL&P) Motion to Dismiss. HL&P moved to dismiss Rocky Mountain
Power's (RMP) Complaint, arguing the Commission lacked subject-matter jurisdiction over
RMP's Complaint. On October 2, 2008, the Commission held a hearing on the Motion. Messrs.
Joseph Dunbeck of Dunbeck & Moss and Gary Dodge of Hatch James & Dodge represented
HL&P. Mr. Dunbeck argued on behalf of HL&P. Mr. Gregory Monson of Stoel Rives, LLP
represented RMP. Mr. Michael Ginsberg appeared for the Division of Public Utilities
(Division). The Commission, having reviewed the moving and responding papers, having heard
oral arguments from the parties, and being otherwise fully appraised in the matter, hereby
DENIES HL&P's Motion.
PROCEDURAL SUMMARY
RMP's Original Complaint
On April 18, 2007, RMP filed its original Complaint against HL&P raising five
causes of action. Generally, RMP alleged that HL&P violated RMP's certificate, usurpation of

DOCKET NO. 07-035-22
-2Commission jurisdiction, violation of U.C.A. § 10-8-14 (Municipal Code), violation of U.C.A. §
11-3-304 (Interlocal Act), and violation of Article I, Section 22 of the Utah Constitution. RMP
sought declaratory relief in relation to the alleged violations. Namely, RMP asked the
Commission to 1) order HL&P cease providing electric service to customers outside its Member
Cities' boundaries and within RMP's certificated areas; 2) find that the actions of HL&P in
concert with Wasatch County in attempting to determine Rocky Mountain's service area are
unlawful; 3) find that the electric service provided by HL&P to retail customers outside of its
Member Cities' boundaries is in violation of the Municipal Code; 4) find that HL&P failed to
obtain one or more certificates of public convenience and necessity in violation of the Interlocal
Cooperation Act; and 5) declare that the electric service provided by HL&P to retail customers
within the Rocky Mountain service area is a taking of RMP's property.
The Stays
There were two stays granted in this action. The Commission granted the first on
June 5, 2007 and the second on August 8,2007. During the stays, the parties attempted to
resolve their disputes but were not successful.
RMP's Original Complaint
On February 5,2008, RMP filed its Amended Complaint. In its jurisdictional
allegations, RMP alleged as follows:
The Commission has jurisdiction over this Amended Complaint because
HL&P is providing retail electrical service to customers outside the municipal
boundaries of its Member Cities [] in violation of Rocky Mountain Power's
Certificate and Utah law. The electrical service provided by HL&P is not the
temporary wholesale of surplus product or service capacity, but is rather part of a
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pattern of providing permanent, continuous, and expanding retail service in the
normal course of business to customers outside the Municipal Boundaries.
Although the Commission does not have jurisdiction over municipalities
providing utility service within their municipal boundaries or making legitimate
temporary wholesale sales of surplus product or service capacity outside of their
municipal boundaries, the Commission is authorized to prohibit continuous retail
service by municipalities outside of their municipal boundaries because in so doing
the municipalities are not engaged in a municipal function authorized by Utah Code
Ann. § 10-8-14 and because customers of the municipalities located outside of their
municipal boundaries have no control over the policies and actions of the
municipalities because they are not able to vote for the elected public officials who
set such policies and authorize such actions.
The Commission also has jurisdiction over this Amended Complaint because,
on information and belief, HL&P has constructed generating plants and transmission
lines without obtaining a certificate of public convenience and
necessity from the Commission in accordance with Utah Code Ann. § 11-13-304.
RMP Amended Complaint, 1H[3-5.
RMP's Amended Complaint
RMP filed an Amended Complaint. In it, RMP requested the Commission make
findings to determine: 1) whether HL&P has "surplus product or service capacity" and, if so, the
amount of HL&P's "surplus product or service capacity"; 2) whether the sale of "surplus product
or service capacity" must be restricted to temporary wholesale sales or may be to retail
customers on a continuing basis; 3) the geographic area in which RMP is obligated to serve if the
Commission determines HL&P has authority to provide retail electric service to customers
outside boundaries of the Member Cities' boundaries; and 4) if the Commission determines
HL&P has authority to provide retail electric service to customers outside its Member Cities'
boundaries, that the Commission amend RMP's Certificate to exclude those areas from RMP's
certificated areas.
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On April 7, 2008, HL&P answered RMP's Amended Complaint. Besides the
general denials, admissions, and affirmative allegations to RMP's Amended Complaint listed in
its First Defense, HL&P also raised five other defenses. Its Second Defense alleges the
Commission lacks subject-matter jurisdiction to adjudicate the issues contained in RMP's
Complaint or grant the relief requested by RMP. In its Third Defense, HL&P raised defenses of
abandonment, forfeiture, waiver, estoppel, and laches, arguing that RMP has been aware of and
encouraged HL&P's development of electric service to the Heber Valley. In its Fourth Defense,
HL&P argues RMP abandoned or forfeited its rights and obligation to provide service to the
Heber Valley and unincorporated areas of Heber Valley. The Fifth Defense claims RMP has
failed to state a claim for which relief can be granted. In its Sixth Defense, HL&P makes an
equitable argument, stating that it should be allowed to continue serving its customers within its
historical service area.
Key Factual Allegations and Admissions
RMP has made certain factual allegations, and HL&P has admitted some facts
that are relevant to this Order. HL&P is an energy services interlocal entity formed under the
Interlocal Act by Heber City, Midway, and the Town of Charleston (Member Cities). RMP
Amended Complaint, ^ 2, HL&P Answer, \ 2. It provides electric service to individuals living
within the Member Cities' boundaries and also to individuals outside of those boundaries—in
unincorporated areas of Wasatch County. HL&P Answer, ^ 3. HL&P admits that it "does not
provide temporary wholesale service to the unincorporated areas of Wasatch County and that as
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of Wasatch County." HL&P Answer, % 3. HL&P also admits that it "intends to continue to serve
customers within its historic service territory," i.e. customers outside its Member Cities'
boundaries. Id. at\lL

RMP has franchises from Wasatch County as early as 1917 authorizing

it to provide electric service to residents of Wasatch County, RMP Amended Complaint, 1f 7,
HL&P Answer, ^ 7; its current franchise expires in 2010, RMP Amended Complaint, f 7, HL&P
Answer, % 7. RMP also has a certificate from the Commission authorizing it to provide electric
service to customers in Wasatch County. RMP Amended Complaint, f 8. Both RMP and HL&P
provide electric service to customers in the unincorporated areas of Wasatch County. RMP
Amended Complaint, ^f 6, HL&P Answer, \6.
HL&P's Motion to Dismiss and Reply
Concurrently with the filing of its Answer, HL&P filed its Motion to Dismiss and
supporting Memorandum. HL&P generally argued that because it was an interlocal entity and
political subdivision of Utah, the Commission lacked jurisdiction to determine the extent of its
authority to serve its customers and define its service territory boundaries. HL&P notes that
U.C.A. 54-4-1 explicitly gives the Commission authority over public utilities— including
electrical corporations, but that HL&P is not an electrical corporation. Under U.C.A. 54-2l(5)(b), governmental entities are excluded from the definition of "corporation." Additionally,
neither is HL&P a "person" under U.C.A. 54-2-2, nor is it an "association" or "company"
subject to Commission jurisdiction, something not contemplated by applicable statutes. HL&P
contends that RMP's arguments to classify HL&P as a "company" or "association" simply
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each municipal electric utility subject to Commission jurisdiction. HL&P further reasons that
the 1989 amendment to U.C.A. 54-2-2, removing the term "governmental entity" from the
definition of "person", clearly shows the Legislature's intent to remove entities such as HL&P
from Commission jurisdiction.
HL&P further contends that RMP and the Division's reliance on the
Commission's 1992 White City Water Company decision, Docket No. 91-018-02 (White City)1 is
mistaken. HL&P contends White City water is either distinguishable, or in the alternative, was
wrongly decided. HL&P contends White City is distinguishable, first, because the Commission
merely decided to retain jurisdiction over a company over which it already had jurisdiction. Part
of the Commission's rationale for retaining jurisdiction was that when Sandy acquired the
company, it also took on "all its regulatory baggage." HL&P contends that, here, it is not
acquiring a public utility, so the Commission cannot "retain jurisdiction" over an entity which it
has never regulated. Secondly, the Commission plainly stated that it was only asserting
jurisdiction to nullify rate discrimination, not to assert jurisdiction over Sandy or to determine its
service area. Therefore, it is inapplicable in this case where RMP does want the Commission to
assert jurisdiction over HL&P and determine its service area.

1

In White City, Sandy City contracted with White City Water Company to purchase the company's water
system and intended to operate the company as a municipal utility. Some of the water company's customers,
however, were non-residents of Sandy and would be charged higher rates than Sandy residents. White City Water
applied to the Commission for an order approving the transfer of all its stock to Sandy. It also sought a declaratory
judgment that the system, under Sandy control, would constitute a municipal water system. As such, it would be free
of Commission jurisdiction—both with regards to customers within and without Sandy city boundaries. In White
City, the Commission ultimately determined that Sandy was not performing a municipal function—insofar as its
service to non-residents was concerned, and thereby was subject to Commission jurisdiction in that aspect
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overruled. HL&P contends the Commission decided the matter upon public policy
considerations, and nowhere listed a statute explicitly authorizing the Commission to assume
jurisdiction. The Commission merely reasoned that the possibility that Sandy might discriminate
against extra-territorial customers, required Commission jurisdiction to regulate Sandy's rates
and protect disenfranchised customers. But because no statute explicitly gives the Commission
jurisdiction over HL&P, it argues the Commission must dismiss the Complaint and allow a civil
court to resolve the disputes between RMP & HL&P.
RMP 's Response to the Motion
RMP responded to HL&P's Motion. RMP first argued that HL&P is subject to
the Commission's jurisdiction because it qualifies as a "person" under § 54-2-1(7) (a)'s
definition of "electrical corporation." A "person" under § 54-2-2 means "individuals,
corporations, partnerships, associations, trusts, and companies." Even if it is a "political
subdivision", HL&P qualifies as a "company", RMP argues, because it is an "association,
partnership, or union—that carries on a commercial or industrial enterprise," or an association or
union of three cities organized for the commercial purpose of providing electric service to
customers within and without Member Cities' boundaries. Additionally, the legislature's
deletion of the term "governmental entity" from the definition of "person" in § 54-2-2 did not
exempt HL&P from all Commission regulation, but merely served to bolster the notion that the
Commission did not generally have jurisdiction over municipal power providers, or entities like
HL&P. Additionally, RMP contends HL&P's arguments regarding its exemption from
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subject to Commission oversight for construction of generation plants and transmission lines
under § 1 l-13-204(2)(a)(I), but also whether HL&P is exempt from Commission oversight for its
provision of product and service into areas outside its Member Cities' boundaries.
RMP cites the White City water case as a basis for jurisdiction. Based on White
City's precedent, the Commission clearly has jurisdiction in this case, RMP contends. In White
City the Commission decided to regulate Sandy's provision of water to non-Sandy residents for
the following reasons: 1) disenfranchised non-residents would not be able to prevent Sandy from
charging them excessively; 2) because Sandy was also an entity of limited jurisdiction like the
Commission, Sandy might possibly have to assume the Commission's role in regulating rates of
non-residents, which would be inappropriate; and 3) Sandy was not performing a municipal
function by proving water to customers outside its boundaries and therefore subjected itself to
regulation. RMP suggest the same reasons supporting Commission jurisdiction in White City are
present here.
RMP also argued that its Complaint goes to another key issue—the nature and
extent of RMP'S obligation to serve in Wasatch County. The Commission was the authority that
issued RMP'S certificate and determined the certificated area. RMP claims the Commission is
the only body with the authority and expertise to regulate RMP's service obligation, including
determining whether RMP has abandoned or forfeited part of its certificate, or whether HL&P
has obtained a right to serve the disputed areas by passage of time.
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that HL&P and "any other interlocal entity or municipal power system has the power to serve
electric customers anywhere in Utah . . . . and that no limitations on that power can be placed
upon it by the Commission." This is not what the legislature intended and therefore, the Motion
must be denied.
The Division's Response to the Motion
The Division also responded to HL&P's Motion. The Division first argued that
under White City's rationale, the Commission should deny the Motion and allow the matter to
proceed. The Division stated that White City held that under certain circumstances the
Commission might have jurisdiction over a city's provision of service outside of its municipal
boundaries. Like Sandy City in White City, HL&P is selling services outside of its
municipalities' boundaries. The sale of the services was not the sale of surplus services.
Additionally, the non-resident customers outside of Sandy City had no say in Sandy governance.
The Division contends similar circumstances exist here. It argues the Commission must assume
jurisdiction to protect disenfranchised customers. The Division stated that given the precedent
already established by White City, the facts alleged by RMP and answers and defenses put forth
by HL&P, and the lack of controlling opinion from the Supreme Court on the issue, the
Commission should retain jurisdiction to determine if the White City case controls.
The Division also argues that the Commission must assume jurisdiction to clarify
the uncertainties that exist with regards to the obligations of RMP to serve residents in
unincorporated areas of Wasatch County, especially in newer developments where there is
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had HL&P not been an interlocal, the Commission would certainly have jurisdiction to regulate
it in the unincorporated areas of Wasatch County. Because non-residents served by HL&P have
no other authority to turn to, the Commission should assume jurisdiction.
Finally, the Division reasons that because HL&P is prohibited from serving nonresidents with services that are not surplus, the Commission can be the only proper authority
with jurisdiction to determine who has the obligation to serve residents in unincorporated areas
of Wasatch County. The Division notes that Article XI, Section 5 of the Utah Constitution
authorizes cities to provide public utilities which are "local in extent and use." Section 10-8-14
of the Utah Code allows municipalities to sell and deliver product or services to non-residents
that are surplus. Article VI, Section 28, states only that the Commission cannot interfere with a
municipalities municipal functions, but does not expressly prohibit the Commission from
regulating municipalities when they are not performing municipal functions. Also, the Division
cites to County Water System v. Salt Lake City, 278 P.2d 285 (Utah 1954), Salt Lake County v.
Salt Lake City, 570 P.2d 119 (Utah 1977), and CP National Corp. v. Public Service Comm'n,
638 P.2d 519, 521 (Utah 1981) to support its proposition that HL&P's Member Cities cannot sell
or deliver non-surplus product or services to non-residents. It recognizes that although no case is
squarely on point, those three cited cases, together with the constitutional and statutory
provisions cited, make it clear that HL&P cannot provide the service it is providing. This being
the case, only the Commission has the jurisdiction to clarify any uncertainties, regulate HL&P
outside is Member Cities5 boundaries, and protect disenfranchised customers.
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Standardfor Motion to Dismiss
HL&P has made a motion to dismiss for lack of subject matter jurisdiction.
Commission Rules do not squarely address how the Commission should treat such a motion. In
light of this, R746-100-1.C provides that "[i]n situations for which there is no provision in these
rules, the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure shall govern

" Rule 12(b)(1) of the Utah Rules of

Civil Procedure is the vehicle for HL&P's Motion. It states HL&P may make its motion to
dismiss for "lack of jurisdiction over the subject matter." There is little, if any, Utah
case law on how to address a 12(b)(1) Motion. Federal case law, however, is instructive.2
Motions to Dismiss for lack of subject matter jurisdiction take two forms. One form is where the
defendant attacks the "sufficiency of the complaint's allegations as to the subject matter
jurisdiction", City ofAlbuquerque v. United States DOI, 379 F.3d 901 (10th Cir. 2004), as
HL&P has done here. In such a case, the adjudicator must presume all the allegations in the
complaint are true. See id. at 906. Therefore, the Commission will presume RMP's factual
allegations are true.
Assumed Factual Allegations
RMP makes two central factual allegations that it states, argue for Commission
jurisdiction and against dismissal. First, RMP alleges HL&P is providing non-temporary, nonsurplus product or service capacity to areas outside of the Member Cities9 boundaries.

~ Interpretations of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure are persuasive where the Utah Rules of Civil
Procedure are "substantially similar" to the federal rules. Lund v. Brown, 2000 UT 75, ^ 26. Utah Rule 12 and
federal Rule 12 are substantially similar.
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unincorporated areas of Wasatch County and that as part of its normal course of business it
provides services to customers in the unincorporated areas of Wasatch County," HL&P Answer,
1f 3. Additionally, HL&P admits it "intends to continue to serve customers within its historic
service territory," i.e. customers outside its Member Cities' boundaries. In essence, RMP
argues, HL&P is acting just like a private commercial enterprise—a public utility, in providing
such service outside its Member Cities' boundaries.3 Second, RMP states that because some
HL&P customers live outside Member City boundaries and cannot vote, they will have no means
of preventing HL&P from charging excessive rates or providing inadequate srvice, if HL&P is
not subject to Commission jurisdiction.
In sum, because applicable law only allows HL&P to provide service and
capacity to customers within its Member Cities' boundaries, any service outside those
boundaries subjects HL&P to Commission jurisdiction, RMP argues. RMP also argues the
Commission must have jurisdiction for protection of extra-territorial customers, as the
Commission has the expertise and was created to protect just such customers.
HL&P Argues it is ExemptfromJurisdiction
HL&P counters that even assuming, arguendo, the facts alleged above are true,
and even while recognizing RMP's legal and public policy arguments for what HL&P cannot or
should not do, factual allegations mixed with public policy considerations provide no statutory

At the hearing, HL&P presented a map showing its "service area.' The boundaries of HL&P5s service area
lie within Wasatch County and have been demarcated by the County. HL&P admits its service area overlaps areas
for which RMP has a certificate from the Commission.
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assert those [powers] which are expressly granted or clearly implied as necessary to the
discharge of the duties and responsibilities imposed upon it." Hi-Country Estates HO A v. Bagley
&Co., 901 P.2d 1017, 1021 (Utah 1995). Even where there might be important public policy
considerations, HL&P argues, if there is reasonable doubt that the Commission has jurisdiction,
then "any reasonable doubt of the existence of any power must be resolved against exercise
thereof." Hi-Country Estates, 901 P.2d at 1021. HL&P claims that RMP has cited no statute
which explicitly gives the Commission jurisdiction over an interlocal providing non-temporary
services to extra-territorial customers.
In fact, HL&P argues that it is explicitly exempt from Commission jurisdiction.
U.C.A. 54-4-1 states the Commission is "vested with power and jurisdiction to supervise and
regulate every public utility in this state, and to supervise all of the business of every such public
utility in this state, and to do all things, whether herein specifically designated or in addition
thereto, which are necessary or convenient in the exercise of such power and jurisdiction . . . . "
U.C.A. 54-2-l(16)(a) states that a "'public utility'" includes every .. .electrical corporation . . .
." An electrical corporation includes "every corporation, cooperative association, and person ..
.owning, controlling, operating, or managing any electric plant, or in any way furnishing electric
power for public service or to its consumers or members for domestic, commercial, or industrial
use, within this state

" U.C.A. 54-2-1(7). Section 54-2-1 states that an electrical corporation

is not defined as "towns, cities, counties . . . or other governmental units created or organized
under any general or special law of this state." One governmental unit that may be created
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"under any general or special law of this state" is an interlocal entity. Two or more Utah public
agencies, such as the Member Cities, may enter into an agreement with one anotlier to create an
energy service interlocal entity under U.C.A. ll-13-203(4)(a). Therefore, under § 54-2-1,
HL&P is an energy service interlocal entity explicitly exempt from jurisdiction. HL&P
additionally argues that U.C.A. § 1 l-13-204(2)(a) explicitly exempts it from the Project Entity
Provisions, U.C.A. § 11-13-304. In this instance, given that it is an interlocal entity, HL&P
contends the statutes are plain on their face. There is no commission jurisdiction over it. The
Commission must grant the Motion, dismiss the Complaint, and let a district court resolve the
dispute.
Interpretation ofApplicable Statutes
If the Commission reads the plain language of sections 54-2-1 and 11-13204(2)(a) in isolation, as HL&P urges, then it would require HL&P exemption from Commission
jurisdiction. However, in attempting to interpret the statutes governing HL&P, the Commission
must read "the plain language of a statute as a whole, and interpret its provisions in harmony
with other statutes in the same chapter and related chapters" Hansen v. Eyre, 2003 UT App
274, f 7 (emphasis added).
Statutes are considered to be in pari materia and thus must be construed together
when they relate to the same person or thing, to the same class of persons or things,
or have the same purpose or object. If... the understanding of the legislature or of
persons affected by the statute would be influenced by another statute, then those
statutes should be construed with reference to one another and harmonized if
possible.
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which was sought to be accomplished." State v. Farrow, 919 P.2d 505 54 (Utah Ct. App. 1996).
Therefore, it is appropriate for the Commission to read those sections upon which
HL&P bases it argument for exemption in relation to the other statutes in the same chapter and
related chapters, and harmonize those sections with other statutes that affect interlocals
generally.
Interlocal Act and Municipal Powers
The intent of the Interlocal Act was to allow municipalities to collectively
exercise the powers its municipal members already possess. See CP National, 638 P.2d at 521
(holding the "intent of the act appears to be to allow municipalities collectively to exercise
powers which they already possess individually.") Section 10-8-14(1) lists some of the powers
municipalities "already possess": "A city may: (a) construct, maintain, and operate .. . electric
light works . . . . (b) authorize the construction, maintenance and operation of the works or
systems listed in Subsection (l)(a) by others;

(d) sell and deliver the surplus product or

service capacity of any works or system listed in Subsection (l)(a), not required by the city or
the city's inhabitants, to others beyond the limits of the city . . . . " If, from the plain language of
U.C.A. § 10-8-14, it seems evident that municipalities may sell and deliver surplus product or
service capacity of its electric light works not required by their inhabitants to those beyond their
limits, then the other side of the coin logically follows: municipalities may not sell and deliver
product or service that is not surplus to those outside their boundaries. This conclusion is

DOCKET NO. 07-035-22
-16supported by two relevant opinions, that—while not exactly on point, are instructive. See e.g.
CPNat'l, 638 P.2d 519; County Water, 278 P.2d 285.
The first is CP National In CP National, eighteen municipalities, under the
Interlocal Act, formed the Southwest Power Agency (SPA) in order to finance and purchase
electric light and power works for their municipalities. SPA commenced negotiations with CP
National for purchase of the entire system. CP National soon informed SPA that it had decided
to sell its system to Utah Power and Light. SPA then informed CP National that unless it
negotiated a purchase with it, it would commence condemnation proceedings. SPA later
commenced condemnation proceedings. In the proceedings, SPA stated that it intended to
purchase CP National and continue service using CP nationals's to-be-condemned electrical
system, not only to customers living within the municipalities' boundaries, but to other
customers living outside the municipalities. While the question answered in CP
National—-whether municipalities had the power to condemn and continue service of entire
public utility systems, is not the question in this matter, the Supreme Court's statement about a
municipalities' powers is applicable here. The Supreme Court cited Section 10-8-14 noting that
it authorized cities to maintain and operate electric light works and authorized them to sell
surplus to those outside of their boundaries. The Supreme Court, in explaining the section, also
went on to explain how it limits municipalities as well:
We believe that this language imposes a limitation on a city operating outside its
borders. It negates the proposition that a city could purposely engage in the
distribution of power to localities or persons outside its limits except to dispose of
surplus.... Section 10-8-14 does not contemplate nor authorize a city to so
operate its electric light and power works.
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The second case is the County Water matter. See 278 P.2d 285. County Water
deals with water works—not with electric service, but is analogous. In County Water, the County
Water System, a public water works utility, was providing water in the same area as Salt lake
City. County Water asked the Supreme Court to decide whether Salty Lake City's sale of
surplus water beyond its city limits was subject to Commission regulation. The Court found the .
sale of surplus water was not. In reaching its conclusion, the Court addressed the fears of
County Water, i.e. that Salt Lake City's selling and delivering of services outside its boundaries
and on a broad scale, would compete with and possibly destroy the privately owned utility's own
provision of service. The Court declared County Water's fears unfounded because "[s]uch
activities are neither contemplated nor authorized by law; [the cities] have no authority to sell
water outside the city limits except as expressly permitted by statute, U.C.A. §10-8-14, which is
to sell the "surplus product.. .not required by the city or its inhabitants." The Court's
statements help identify the limits of a municipalities' powers in providing public services and
are analogous. Just as U.C.A. §10-8-14 does not authorize a city to sell non-surplus water
outside its city limits, neither does it authorize a city to sell non-surplus electricity.
The powers of the interlocal simply mirror those of the individual municipalities
and are no greater. U.C.A. 11-13-213 states "Any two or more public agencies may make
agreements between or among themselves: (1) for the joint ownership of any one or more
facilities or improvements which they have authority by law to own individually; (2) for the joint
operation of any one or more facilities or improvements which they have authority by law to
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Interlocal Entity, like HL&P, may be formed "to accomplish the purposes of [the public
agencies'] joint and cooperative action with respect to facilities, services, and improvements
necessary or desirable with respect to the acquisition, generation, transmission, management, and
distribution of electric energy for the use and benefit of the public agencies that enter into the
agreement" U.C.A. § 11-13-203. Taking the principles garnered from CP National and County
Water, if the municipalities may "construct, maintain, and operate . . . electric light works" and
"sell and deliver the surplus product or service capacity of [those] works or system . . . not
required by the city or the city's inhabitants, to others beyond the limits of the city", then so may
the interlocal organized by those municipalities. U.C.A. § 10-8-14. But it also stands to reason
that if municipalities may not sell and deliver product or service that is not surplus to those
outside their boundaries, then neither may interlocals organized by those municipalities.
HL&P's argument is that because there is no statute explicitly giving the
Commission jurisdiction over an energy services interlocal entity like itself, then the appropriate
forum for resolving RMP's dispute is the district court, not the Commission. HL&P's isolated
reading of the statutes, however, is inappropriate.
Whatever conduct those statutes or cases may authorize for HL&P (and which
would not fall within the Commission's jurisdiction), they still do not preclude the
Commission's jurisdiction over an entity like HL&P when its operations or activities exceed
those delineated by statute.
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The reason for the mandate to read "the plain language of a statute as a whole,
and interpret its provisions in harmony with other statutes in the same chapter and related
chapters" is to interpret the intent of the legislature.
"The fundamental consideration which transcends all others in regard to the
interpretation and application of a statute is: What was the intent of the
legislature? All other rules of statutory construction are subordinate to it and are
helpful only insofar as they assist in attaining that objective. In determining that
intent the statute should be considered in the light of the purpose it was designed
to serve and so applied as to carry out that purpose if that can be done consistent
with its language."
CP National 638 P.2d at 522 (quoting Johnson v. State Tax Comm % 411 P.2d 831 (Utah
1966)). HL&P's assertion, taken to its logical end, would impliedly leave one with the
conclusion that an entity like HL&P could categorize anything to do with its sale and delivery of
non-surplus product or service capacity as exempt from Commission jurisdiction. Because the
legislature explicitly failed to speak on the subject, then any interlocal or municipality could
bypass the regulatory mechanism by forming an energy service interlocal entity, then use that
interlocal to compete with or substitute itself for a public utility's service in areas outside the
municipalities9 boundaries. The question is whether the legislature intended for this apparent
"gap" to allow an interlocal to compete in such a manner. When viewing all the statutes
governing interlocals and related statutes, those governing Commission jurisdiction, and case
law interpreting these statutes, the answer is no.
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within the limits of its powers, it is not subject to Commission jurisdiction. When it is acting just
like a public utility in selling, delivering non-surplus services to customers outside member city
boundaries, it is, for all intents and purposes, acting like a public utility insofar as its service to
extra-territorial customers. To the extent it serves those extra-territorial customers, and to the
extent it is acting just like any other public utility, it seems the legislature intended it would be
considered a corporation, association, etc. and would be subject to commission jurisdiction as
would any other public utility. This seems to be the legislative intent. The legislature did not
intend to leave a gap for governmental agencies, like interlocals, to form what are essentially
unregulated public utilities in an effort to target and serve non-resident customers in an effort to
compete with certificated utilities. To conclude otherwise would undermine the purpose of the
regulatory scheme the legislature implemented.
The Supreme Court has already concluded the same.
There is good justification for this limitation since municipally owned utilities are
not subject to the jurisdiction and supervision of the Public Service Commission,
but are controlled solely by the administration of the city or town wherein they
are located. Customers who are non-residents of the municipalities would be left
at the mercy of officials over whom they have no control at the ballot box, and
they could not turn to the Public Service Commission for relief.
CP National, 63 8 P.2d at 524.
For these reasons, HL&P's Motion is denied.
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pursuant to the Utah Administrative Procedures Act, U.C.A. §§ 63-46b-l etseq. Failure to do so
will bar judicial review of the grounds not identified for review. U.C.A. § 54-7-15.
DATED at Salt Lake City, Utah, this 3rd day of November, 2008.

I si Ruben H. Arredondo
Administrative Law Judge
Approved and confirmed this 3rd day of November, 2008, as the Report and
Order of the Public Service Commission of Utah.

Isi Ted Bover. Chairman

I si Ric Campbell. Commissioner
I si Ron Allen. Commissioner
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